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Abstract
Password leakage is one of the most common security threats for pervasive password-
based user authentication. The design of a secure and usable password entry against
password leakage remains a challenge since twenty year ago when the first aca-
demic proposal attempted to address it. This dissertation focuses on investigating
the difficulty in designing leakage-resilient password entry (LRPE) schemes and
exploring the feasibility of constructing secure and usable LRPE schemes with the
assistance of state-of-the-art technology.
The first work in this dissertation reveals the infeasibility of designing practical
LRPE schemes in the absence of trusted devices by investigating the inherent trade-
off between security and usability in LRPE design. We start with demonstrating that
most of the existing LRPE schemes without using trusted devices are subject to two
types of generic attacks - brute force and statistical attacks, whose power has been
underestimated in the literature. In order to defend against these two generic attacks,
we introduce five design principles that are necessary to achieve leakage resilience
in the absence of trusted devices. We show that these attacks cannot be effectively
mitigated without significantly sacrificing the usability of LRPE schemes. To bet-
ter understand the tradeoff between security and usability of LRPE schemes, we
further propose a quantitative analysis framework on usability costs of password
entry schemes based on experimental psychology. Our analysis shows that a secure
LRPE scheme in practical settings always imposes a considerable amount of cogni-
tive workload on its users, which indicates the inherent limitations of such schemes
and in turn implies that an LRPE scheme has to incorporate certain trusted device
in order to be both secure and usable.
Following the first work, we further explore the feasibility of designing prac-
tical LRPE schemes by analyzing the existing LRPE schemes that utilize trusted
devices. We develop a broad set of design metrics which cover three aspects in
evaluating LRPE schemes, including quantitative usability costs with specified se-
curity strength, built-in security, and universal accessibility. We apply these design
metrics on existing LRPE schemes, revealing that all the schemes have limitations,
which may explain why none of them are widely adopted. However, our further
analysis indicates that it is possible to overcome these limitations by improving the
design according to the proposed metrics.
Guided by these design metrics, we propose a secure and usable LRPE scheme
leveraging on the touchscreen feature of mobile devices. These devices provide
additional features such as touchscreen that are not available in the traditional set-
tings, which makes it possible to achieve both security and usability objectives that
are difficult to achieve in the past. Our scheme named CoverPad achieves leak-
age resilience while retaining most benefits of legacy passwords. The usability of
CoverPad is evaluated with an extended user study which includes additional test
conditions related to time pressure, distraction, and mental workload. These test
conditions simulate common situations for a password entry scheme used on a daily
basis, which have not been evaluated in the prior literature. The results of our user
study show the impacts of these test conditions on user performance as well as the
practicability of the proposed scheme.
This dissertation makes contributions on understanding and solving the problem
of designing secure and usable LRPE schemes. The proposed design principles,
design metrics, analysis and evaluation methodologies are applicable to not only
LRPE schemes but also generic user authentication schemes, which provide useful
insights for the field of user authentication research. The proposed scheme has
been implemented as a prototype, which can be used to effectively defend against
password leakage during password entry.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The wide adoption of computing systems not only transforms many physical assets
into virtual assets but also creates new assets that only exist in the virtual world.
Preventing unauthorized access to these assets is one of the major themes of infor-
mation security, where user authentication is the key mechanism to guarantee that
only legitimate users can access protected assets. Passwords have been the most
pervasive means for user authentication since the advent of computers. Compared
to their alternatives, such as biometrics and smartcards, passwords are much eas-
ier and cheaper to create, update, and revoke. However, the use of passwords has
intrinsic problems. Among them, password leakage is one of the most common
security threats [49]. Password leakage can be caused by various attacks including
malware, key logger, and hidden camera. The consequence of password leakage
could be catastrophic, as password-based authentication has been widely used for
financial services, social networks, and other valuable services.
The design of a secure and usable password entry against password leakage
remains a challenge since twenty year ago when the first academic proposal [52] at-
tempted to address it. The difficulty comes from the fact that passwords are widely
used not only within organizations such as governments and companies, but also by
every individual who uses a computing system. Therefore, unlike early security sys-
tems [60, 2] that are mainly designed to be operated by well-trained users with dedi-
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cated devices, a secure and usable leakage-resilient password entry (LRPE) scheme
brings the following challenges: 1) The users may not have sufficient knowledge
and skills due to cognitive limitations or other conditions; 2) The devices for sys-
tem deployment may not implement all the required features due to manufacturing,
management, or other costs. Both restrictions have to be properly addressed in an
LRPE scheme intended for practical use.
This dissertation investigates the difficulty in designing LRPE schemes and ex-
ploring the feasibility of constructing secure and usable LRPE schemes with the as-
sistance of state-of-the-art technology. We first identify the inherent limitations of
designing LRPE schemes, then establish the key design metrics that affect the prac-
ticability of LRPE schemes, and finally develop a secure and usable LRPE scheme
leveraging on the touchscreen feature of mobile devices. The details of these works
are introduced as follows.
1.1 Identify the Limitations
The first work in this dissertation reveals the infeasibility of designing practical
LRPE schemes in the absence of trusted devices by investigating the inherent trade-
off between security and usability in LRPE design. Compared to an LRPE scheme,
legacy passwords that are used pervasively ask a user to directly input his entire
plaintext password recalled from the user’s memory, so that an observation of a
single authentication session is sufficient to capture the password. In order to pre-
vent password leakage during password entry, a user needs to input the password
indirectly, which imposes an extra burden on the user and creates a tradeoff between
security and usability. How to design a password entry scheme that minimizes pass-
word leakage and is still easy to use is the fundamental problem in LRPE design.
It was an interesting problem of designing a secure and usable LRPE scheme
without using any trusted devices. The technical challenge behind this problem is
to handle the capability asymmetry between user and adversary. An adversary may
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use a hidden camera or malicious software to record complete interactions between
a user and his computer and then analyze the data with powerful machines. Many
LRPE schemes [35, 48, 71, 72, 78, 10, 6] have been proposed to defend against this
type of password leakage attacks without utilizing any trusted devices. However, as
we will demonstrate later, all these existing proposals with acceptable usability are
vulnerable to either or both types of generic attacks: brute force attack and statistical
attack. We notice that these two generic attacks are different from other specific
attacks [32, 47]. They cannot be easily defended without significantly sacrificing
the scheme’s usability, which implies inherent limitations of LRPE schemes without
using trusted devices. In order to defend against these attacks, we introduced five
design principles which should be followed to achieve leakage resilience. Using
counterexamples, we show that an LRPE scheme can be easily broken when these
principles are violated.
To further understand the tradeoff between security and usability in the design
of LRPE schemes, we propose for the first time a quantitative analysis framework
on usability costs of LRPE schemes. This framework decomposes the process of
human-computer authentication into atomic cognitive operations. Performance data
of average human-beings reported in psychology literatures [65, 27, 21, 70, 22, 55,
57, 19, 73, 74, 36, 17, 34] are used to estimate usability costs of existing LRPE
schemes [35, 48, 71, 72, 78, 10, 6]. Our analysis results are consistent with the
experimental results reported in the original literatures, while the hidden costs pre-
viously not addressed are identified. Our results show that a secure LRPE scheme in
practical settings [35, 6] always leads to a considerable amount of cognitive work-
load, which explains why some of the existing LRPE schemes require extremely
long authentication time and have high authentication error rate. This limitation
has not been, and will not be easily solved in the design of LRPE schemes in the
absence of trusted devices.
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1.2 Explore the Feasibility
Under the limitations discovered in the first work, the second work in this disser-
tation explores the feasibility of designing practical LRPE schemes with the assis-
tance of trusted devices. A trusted device forms a secure channel between user
and server, which ensures that at least part of the authentication process should
be invisible to an adversary so as to prevent password leakage while maintain-
ing acceptable usability in realistic settings. However, despite of many prior ef-
forts [44, 61, 23, 25, 42, 13, 12], there is still no practical and widely adopted solu-
tion today. This raises a question on the practicability of adopting a secure channel
in password-based authentication.
In this study, we make the first attempt to systematically investigate the chal-
lenges of designing usable LRPE schemes even when a secure channel is available.
We first formalize the authentication process of LRPE schemes and classify exist-
ing schemes into three common design paradigms. We then develop a broad set of
design metrics, which cover three aspects in evaluating LRPE schemes, including
quantitative usability costs with specified security strengths, built-in security, and
universal accessibility. Unlike traditional evaluation metrics, the proposed metrics
are designed to identify the potential limitations of an LRPE scheme in the design
phase before carrying out user studies.
We apply our design metrics to existing LRPE schemes, which reveals and iden-
tifies their limitations. The major limitations include: 1) the requirement of an
uncommon device feature, 2) the inoperability in certain common scenarios, and 3)
the lack of trusted execution environment. This partially explains why none of these
schemes are widely adopted nowadays. However, it does not necessarily imply that
it is infeasible to design an LRPE scheme that is both secure and practical. Our fur-
ther analysis indicates that it is possible to overcome these limitations by improving
the design according to the proposed metrics.
4
1.3 Construct a Practical Design
Guided by the metrics developed in the second work, the third work in this disser-
tation proposes a secure and usable LRPE scheme leveraging on the touchscreen
feature of mobile devices. These devices provide additional features such as touch-
screen that are not available in the traditional settings, which makes it possible to
achieve both security and usability objectives that are difficult to achieve in the past.
Our scheme named CoverPad achieves leakage resilience of password entry
while retaining most benefits of legacy passwords. Leakage resilience is achieved
by utilizing the gesture detection feature of touchscreen in forming a cover for user
inputs. This cover is used to safely deliver hidden messages, which break the corre-
lation between the underlying password and the interaction information observable
to an adversary. From the other perspective, our scheme is also designed to retain
the benefits provided by legacy passwords. This requirement is critical, as Bonneau
et al. [15] concluded that any user authentication is unlikely to gain traction if it
does not retain comparable benefits of legacy passwords. Our scheme approaches
this requirement by involving only intuitive cognitive operations and requiring no
extra devices in the design.
We implement three variants of CoverPad and evaluate them with an extended
user study. This study includes additional test conditions related to time pressure,
distraction, and mental workload. These test conditions simulate common situa-
tions for a daily-used password entry scheme, which have not been evaluated in
the prior literature. We design new experiments to examine their influence based
on previous work in psychology literature [40, 22, 38]. Experimental results show
the influence of these conditions on user performance and the practicability of our
proposed scheme.
5
1.4 Contributions and Organization
To summarize, the following contributions have been made in this dissertation:
• We analyze and demonstrate the effectiveness of two types of generic attacks,
brute force and statistical attacks, against leakage-resilient password entry
(LRPE) schemes. We propose two statistical attack techniques, probabilistic
decision tree and multi-dimensional counting, and show their effectiveness
against existing schemes. We introduce five principles that are necessary to
mitigate brute force and statistical attacks. We use typical existing LRPE pro-
posals as counterexamples to show that an adversary can easily obtain a user’s
password in the schemes violating our principles. We establish the first quan-
titative analysis framework on usability costs of the existing LRPE schemes.
This framework utilizes the performance models of atomic cognitive opera-
tions in authentication to estimate usability costs. Our analysis result shows
that there is a strong tradeoff between security and usability in the existing
LRPE schemes. It implies that an unaided human may not be competent
enough to effectively use a secure LRPE scheme in practical settings; in other
words, it is inevitable to incorporate certain trusted device in LRPE design.
• We identify the challenges of designing usable LRPE schemes even with the
presence of trusted devices, and classify existing LRPE schemes into three
common design paradigms. We develop a broad set of design metrics for
LRPE schemes, which defines quantitative relation between security and us-
ability, and extends the scope of security and usability to include built-in se-
curity and universal accessibility. We apply the proposed metrics on existing
LRPE schemes and reveal that all the schemes have limitations that could be
further improved. Our analysis provides not only a systematic understanding
on existing LRPE schemes, but also a useful guide for the future research in
this area.
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• We propose a secure and usable LRPE scheme named CoverPad to protect
password entry on touchscreen mobile devices. It achieves leakage resilience
and retains most benefits of legacy passwords by involving only intuitive cog-
nitive operations and requiring no extra devices. We implement three variants
of CoverPad to address different user preferences. Our user study shows the
practicability of these variants. We extend user study methodology to examine
the influence of various additional test conditions. Among these conditions,
time pressure and mental workload are shown to have significant impacts on
user performance. Therefore, it is recommended to include these conditions
in the evaluation of user authentication schemes in the future.
The reminder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is a litera-
ture review which examines closely related research on leakage-resilient password
entry (LRPE). Chapter 3 investigates the limitations of designing LRPE schemes.
Chapter 4 studies the feasibility of designing practical LRPE schemes by analyz-
ing the existing LRPE schemes that utilize trusted devices and establishes the key
design metrics that affect the practicability of LRPE schemes. Chapter 5 provides
a secure and usable LRPE scheme leveraging on the touchscreen feature of mobile
devices. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions of this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
As one of the most important security tools of modern society, password-based user
authentication has been extensively investigated. We summarize the closely related
research work from the following aspects: attacks, principles, tradeoff analysis,
design metrics, and system designs for Leakage-Resilient Password Entry (LRPE).
Most of proposed LRPE schemes have been broken. The recent works on rep-
resentative attack and analysis include: Golle and Wagner proposed the SAT attack
[32] against the CAS schemes [71]; Li et al. demonstrated the brute-force attack
[46] against the PAS scheme [10]; they later presented a Gaussian elimination-
based algebraic attack [47] against the virtual password scheme [45]; Asghar et
al. introduced a statistical attack [5] against the CHC scheme [72]; Dunphy et
al. analyzed a replay-based shoulder surfing attack for recognition-based graphical
password schemes under a weaker threat model [26]. Compared to them, our work
[75] provides security analysis in a more generic setting, which presents two types
of generic attacks that can be used to analyze any LRPE schemes. Furthermore,
we introduce a new statistical attack, probabilistic decision tree, and a generalized
version of existing statistical attacks, multi-dimensional counting. We analyze and
re-examine the existing LRPE schemes with these new attack tools. Thereby, we
discover the vulnerabilities of Undercover [61] and SecHCI [48] that have not been
reported before. We notice that a recent work by Perkovic et al. [56] also identified
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the design flaw of Undercover independently.
Some other design principles have been proposed for LRPE schemes. Roth
et al. [58] proposed the basic principle of using cognitive trapdoor game, where
the knowledge of secret should not be directly revealed during password entry. Li
and Shum [48] later suggested another three principles that require time-variant
responses, randomness in challenges and responses, and indistinguishability against
the statistical analysis. Our principles further extend the coverage by including the
defense principles against brute force attack, and provide more concrete guidelines
against two generic statistical attacks introduced in our work [75].
Until now it is still a challenge to provide a quantitative tradeoff analysis among
multiple LRPE schemes [14]. As pointed out by Biddle et al. [14], the usability
evaluation in prior research lacks consistency, which makes it is difficult to compare
those results. Our quantitative analysis framework is the first attempt to provide a
uniform usability measurement based on experimental psychology. Based on this
framework and our security analysis, we discover that the tradeoff between security
and usability is strong in the absence of trusted devices, which indicates the inherent
limitation in the design of LRPE schemes. This limitation was first addressed by
Hopper and Blum [35], where they hoped the future research could find out practical
solutions for unaided humans that satisfy both security and usability requirements.
Unfortunately, from our results, such solution may not exist (i.e. at least a partial
secure channel formed by a trusted device has to be incorporated). Coskun and
Herley [20] also reached a similar conclusion by analyzing the efficiency of brute
force attack with regards to response entropy. Their conclusion is based on the
assumption that a user has to make a large number of sequential binary decisions
so as to increase response entropy. However, this assumption may not be valid as
humans have a strong parallel processing capability when performing certain visual
tasks (e.g. visual search).
To the best of our knowledge, our work also makes the first attempt to estab-
lish comprehensive design metrics for LRPE schemes, which include the relations
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between security and usability, built-in security, and universal accessibility. Un-
like traditional evaluation metrics, these design metrics can be used to identify the
potential limitations during the design phase before conducting user studies. The
concept of built-in security is also mentioned in a recent field study by De Luca et
al. [24]. Bonneau et al. [15] recently proposed a generic framework for evaluating
user authentication proposals. Their framework introduced twenty-five usability,
deployability and security benefits from users’ perspective, which is different from
our metrics developed from designers’ perspective. Our metrics are more specific
and quantitative, which aim to guide the design of practical LRPE schemes. We
also introduce new metrics related to form factor, social norms, and pressure, which
are not addressed in the existing works.
As indicated by our design metrics, it is not trivial to design a practical
LRPE scheme even with the assistance of a partial secure channel. As the coun-
terexamples [61, 25] shown in our work, an LRPE scheme may still leak se-
cret information related to the password under its secure channel prerequisite.
The establishment of partial secure channels may require the adoption of new
user interface technologies such as touchscreen. This explains why most LRPE
schemes [44, 61, 23, 25, 42, 13, 12] with partial secure channels were proposed in
recent years. Among them, our scheme design [76] was mostly inspired by the con-
cept of physical metaphor introduced in [42]. Our scheme distinguishes itself from
prior work in the sense that it not only achieves leakage resilience but also retains
most benefits of legacy passwords, while some of prior schemes [61, 25] are flawed
in terms of security, and the others incur extra usability costs due to various rea-
sons including: 1) using an uncommon device such as gaze tracker [44, 23], haptic
motor [13], and large pressure-sensitive screen [42], 2) requiring an extra accessory
device [12], and 3) inoperable in a non-stationary environment [13].
On the other hand, the procedure of applying random transformations on a fixed
password used in our scheme design is a classic idea to prevent password leakage.
But it is not easy to be realized in a human-friendly manner without the new user in-
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terface technologies, which are only available on modern computing devices. These
new technologies give our scheme advantages when compared to recently patented
schemes. Take GridCode [30] as an example, which asks users to memorize extra
secrets (besides the passwords) in order to perform the transformations specified
in its scheme design, while our scheme does not have such requirement. Another
advantage of our scheme is that each character of the password uses a different hid-
den transformation during an authentication attempt, while GridCode uses the same
transformation for all the characters in the password. If a hidden transformation in
GridCode is disclosed, the entire password will be exposed. However, if a hidden
transformation in our scheme is disclosed, only the single character associated with
the transformation will be exposed. These two fundamental differences show both
security and usability advantages of our scheme [76].
Other prior research related to password-based user authentication can be found
in a recent survey paper [14], which summarized the development of new password
entry schemes in the past decade.
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Chapter 3
On Limitations of Designing
Leakage-Resilient Password Entry:
Attacks, Principles and Usability
3.1 Introduction
This chapter reveals the infeasibility of designing practical leakage-resilient pass-
word entry (LRPE) schemes in the absence of trusted devices by investigating the
inherent tradeoff between security and usability in LRPE design. Compared to an
LRPE scheme, legacy passwords that are used pervasively ask a user to directly
input his entire plaintext password recalled from the user’s memory, so that an ob-
servation of a single authentication session is sufficient to capture the password. In
order to prevent password leakage during password entry, a user needs to input the
password indirectly, which imposes an extra burden on the user and creates a trade-
off between security and usability. How to design a password entry scheme that
minimizes password leakage and is still easy to use is the fundamental problem in
LRPE design.
An ideal LRPE scheme allows a user to generate a one-time password (OTP) for
each authentication session based on an easy-to-remember password. This can be
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easily achieved when a secure channel is available between user and authentication
service. The secure channel blinds the adversary by decoupling a user input from
the underlying password, when the message delivered over the secure channel is not
revealed to the adversary. However, the prerequisite of a secure channel may be in-
feasible or introduces other vulnerabilities in practical settings. For example, when
the secure channel is formed by a trusted device such as secure token or mobile
phone, that device is subject to theft or loss. This motivates the existing research on
usable and secure LRPE schemes with only the support of human cognitive capa-
bilities [52, 35, 58, 48, 71, 72, 78, 10, 61, 6]. A few representative schemes include
Convex Hull Click (CHC) [72], Cognitive Authentication Scheme (CAS) [71], and
Predicate-based Authentication Service (PAS) [10].
The difficulty in designing an LRPE scheme stems from the capability asymme-
try between user and strong adversary. A strong adversary may use a hidden camera
or malicious software to record complete interactions between a user and his com-
puter and then analyze the data with powerful machines. Many LRPE schemes
[35, 48, 71, 72, 78, 10, 61, 6] have been proposed to defend against this type of
password leakage attacks. However, as we will demonstrate later in this work, all
the existing proposals with acceptable usability are vulnerable to either or both types
of generic attacks: brute force attack and statistical attack.
Brute force attack is a pruning process for the entire candidate password set,
whose strength has often being underestimated in prior research. Our experiments
show that brute force attack is able to recover the passwords of certain existing
LRPE schemes from a small number of observations of authentication sessions.
Statistical attack, on the other hand, represents a learning process to extract a user’s
password due to statistical significance of the password. We introduce two types of
statistical attack, probabilistic decision tree and multi-dimensional counting. Rig-
orous experiments are conducted to show the effectiveness of these two attacks in
breaking existing schemes.
We note that these two generic attacks are different from other specific attacks
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that have been systematically studied in the literature, including SAT [32] and Gaus-
sian elimination [47]. SAT attacks can be efficiently prevented by asking a user to
select only one of the correct responses while multiple correct responses can be
derived from each challenge, since this would increase the size of the SAT expres-
sion exponentially with the number of observations. On the other hand, Gaussian
elimination-based algebraic attacks can be efficiently prevented by using a non-
linear response function [48] or introducing noises from user’s intentional mistakes
[35]. Unlike these specific attacks, brute force and statistical attacks cannot be eas-
ily defended without significantly sacrificing the scheme’s usability, which implies
inherent limitations of LRPE schemes without using trusted devices. In order to
defend against these attacks, we introduced five design principles which should be
followed to achieve leakage resilience. Using counterexamples, we show that an
LRPE scheme can be easily broken when these principles are violated.
To further understand the tradeoff between security and usability in the de-
sign of LRPE schemes, we propose for the first time a quantitative analysis
framework on usability costs of LRPE schemes. This framework decomposes
the process of human-computer authentication into atomic cognitive operations.
Performance data of average human-beings reported in psychology literatures
[65, 27, 21, 70, 22, 55, 57, 19, 73, 74, 36, 17, 34] are used to estimate usability
costs of existing LRPE schemes [35, 48, 71, 72, 78, 10, 61, 6]. Our analysis re-
sults are consistent with the experimental results reported in the original literatures,
while the hidden costs previously not addressed are identified. Our results show
that a secure LRPE scheme in practical settings [35, 6] always leads to a consider-
able amount of cognitive workload, which explains why some of the existing LRPE
schemes require extremely long authentication time and have high authentication
error rate. This limitation has not been, and will not be easily solved in LRPE
design in the absence of trusted devices.
In a nutshell, the contributions of this work are three-fold:
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• We analyze and demonstrate the effectiveness of two types of generic attacks,
brute force and statistical attacks, against LRPE schemes. We propose two
statistical attack techniques, probabilistic decision tree and multi-dimensional
counting, and show their effectiveness against existing schemes.
• We introduce five principles that are necessary to mitigate brute force and sta-
tistical attacks. We use typical existing LRPE proposals as counterexamples
to show that an adversary can easily obtain a user’s password in the schemes
violating our principles.
• We establish the first quantitative analysis framework on usability costs of
the existing LRPE schemes. This framework utilizes the performance models
of atomic cognitive operations in authentication to estimate usability costs.
Our analysis result shows that there is a strong tradeoff between security and
usability in the existing LRPE schemes. It implies that an unaided human
may not be competent enough to effectively use a secure LRPE scheme in
practical settings; in other words, it is inevitable to incorporate certain trusted
device in LRPE design.
3.2 Definitions and Threat Model
In this section, we introduce related notions and our threat model. We focus on the
fundamental problem of designing LRPE schemes for unaided humans, i.e. when
a secure channel or trusted device is unavailable. We exclude the LRPE schemes
using secure channel or trusted device in this work unless explicitly mentioned.
3.2.1 Leakage-Resilient Password Entry
An LRPE scheme is essentially a challenge-response protocol between human and
computer (as demonstrated in Figure 3.1). We refer to human as user, and computer
as server. During registration, a user and a server agree on a root secret, usually
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referred to as a password. The user later uses the root secret to generate responses
to challenges issued by the server to prove his identity. Unlike legacy passwords, a
response in LRPE is an obfuscated message derived from the root secret, rather than
the plaintext of the root secret itself. Considering the limited cognitive capabilities
of unaided humans, a usable obfuscation function F is usually a many-to-one map-
ping from a large candidate set to a small answer set. The small size of the answer
set increases the success rate of guessing attack where an adversary attempts to pass
the authentication by randomly picking an answer from the answer set. For this rea-
son, an authentication session of LRPE often requires executing multiple rounds
of the challenge-response procedure in order to reach an expected authentication
strength D (specifically, the resistance against random guessing, e.g. D = 10−6 for
6-digit PIN), where each round is referred to as an authentication round. We use d to
denote the average success rate of guessing attack per authentication round. Given
d and D, the minimum number m of authentication rounds for an authentication
session is dlogdDe.
Challenge 1 based on round secret BcL
Response 1
Challenge n based on round secret FaM
Response n
Authentication 
Round
Authentication 
Session
Share the root secret xBcLyFaMz
Figure 3.1: Demonstration of a typical LRPE scheme
To imbue the server with a high flexibility in challenge generation, the k-out-
of-n paradigm [35] has been adopted for secret agreement in most existing LRPE
schemes [35, 48, 71, 72, 78, 61, 6]. In this paradigm, the root secret consists of k
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independent elements randomly drawn from a pool of n elements. An element can
be an image, a text character, or any symbol in a notational scheme. The set of k
secret elements is called the secret set (and forms the root secret of the user), and the
complementary set is called the decoy set. The server knows the secret set chosen
by the user, and uses a subset or all of these k elements to generate the challenge in
each round. We refer to the chosen portion of the root secret for an authentication
round as a round secret.
Based on the above notions, the common system parameters of the most ex-
isting LRPE schemes [35, 48, 71, 72, 78, 10, 61, 6] can be described by a tuple
(D, k, n, d, w, s), where D is the expected authentication strength of an authentica-
tion session, k is the number of secret elements drawn from an alphabet of n can-
didate elements, d is the average success rate of guessing attack in a single round,
w is the average window size which is the number of elements appearing on the
screen for an authentication round, and s is the average length of user’s decision
path which is the number of decisions that a user has to make before producing
the correct response for an authentication round. The total round number m can
be derived from D and d. The parameters m, w, and s are required for usability
evaluation. More details will be given in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
3.2.2 Threat Model and Experimental Settings
There are two types of passive adversary models for password leakage attacks used
in prior research. The weaker passive adversary model (e.g. cognitive shoulder-
surfing [58]) assumes that the adversary is not able to capture the complete interac-
tion between a user and the server [58]. Such an assumption actually forms a secure
channel between user and server, which transforms the password leakage problem
to the protection of the secure channel. However, this assumption may not hold for
a prepared adversary who deploys a hidden camera, key logger, or phishing web site
to capture the whole password entry process. To address such realistic concerns, re-
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cent efforts [48, 71, 72, 78, 10, 61, 6] have focused on the strong passive adversary
model, where the adversary is allowed to record the complete interaction between
the user and the server.
In the strong passive adversary model, password leakage during human-
computer authentication is unavoidable. The user’s response is based on his knowl-
edge of the password, which distinguishes it from a random choice as required for
the authentication purpose. This difference leaks information about the password.
After recording a sufficient number of authentication rounds, the adversary may
use any reasonable computation resources to analyze and recover the underlying
password. The research problem under such a threat model is to lower the rate of
password leakage while maintaining acceptable usability for unaided humans.
In this work, we consider both brute force attack and statistical attack under
this strong passive adversary model. The security strength of an LRPE scheme is
defined as the resistance against these two generic attacks given the same success
rate of random guessing (i.e. the same authentication strength for a legitimate user).
We will use simulation experiments to evaluate the security strength of existing
schemes, whose process is summarized as follow: 1) Generate a random password
as the root secret (i.e. the password); 2) Generate a challenge for an authentication
round; 3) Generate a response based on the password and the underlying scheme
design; 4) Analyze the collected challenge-response pairs after each authentication
round assuming that the adversary has full knowledge of the scheme design except
the password; 5) Repeat steps 2, 3, and 4 until the exact password is recovered. The
final findings shown in the following sections are the average results of 20 runs for
each scheme.
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3.3 Brute Force Attack and Its Defense Principles
3.3.1 Attack Strategy
Brute force attack is a general pruning-based learning process, where the adversary
keeps removing irrelevant candidates when more and more cues are available. Its
procedure can be described as follows: 1) List all possible candidates for the secret
in the target scheme; 2) For each independent observation of a challenge-response
round, check the validity of each candidate in the current candidate set by running
the verification algorithm used by the server, and remove invalid candidates from
the candidate set; 3) Repeat the above step until the size of candidate set reaches a
small threshold.
The above procedure shows that the efficiency of brute force attack in the leak-
age resilience setting is design-independent, and is only limited by the size of the
candidate set. We introduce two statements to further describe the power of brute
force attack. These statements apply not only to root secret, but also to round secrets
when the adversary is able to reliably group the observations for individual round
secret.
Statement 1: The verification algorithm used in brute force attack for candidate
verification is at least as efficient as the verification algorithm used by server for
response verification.
The proof is trivial as the verification process for candidate pruning is essentially
the same as the verification process for the server to check correct response. It
is also possible for the adversary to design a more efficient algorithm if there are
correlations between candidates.
Statement 2: The average shrinking rate for the size of valid candidate set is the
same as one minus the average success rate of guessing attack.
The average success rate of guessing attack is defined as the probability of gener-
ating correct response by randomly picking a candidate from the candidate set. This
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is an equivalent definition of average shrinking rate of the valid candidate set. Given
X as the size of the candidate set, and d as the average success rate of guessing at-
tack, the average number of rounds to recover the exact secret is m = dlog1/dXe,
assuming that each candidate is independent of each other. If each candidate is
not independent, the average number of rounds to recover the exact secret will be
smaller than m. This statement can be used to estimate the average success rate of
guessing attack, d = X−
1
m , when the precise analysis is difficult to perform (see
later examples). The statement also explains why most password entry schemes
[58] reveal the entire secret after one or two authentication sessions recorded by the
adversary, as their expected success rates of guessing attack are sufficiently low so
that the whole candidate set rapidly collapse to the exact secret. This implies that,
when brute force attack is feasible, enhancing strength against guessing attack is
strictly at the cost of sacrificing leakage resilience.
3.3.2 P1: Large Root Secret Space Principle
Principle 1: An LRPE scheme with password leakage should have a large candidate
set for the root secret.
The first principle requires a large password space as the basic defense against
brute force attack, where large means that it is computational infeasible for the
adversary to enumerate all candidates in a practical setting (the same meaning of
large will be used in the following discussion). This principle seems trivial but ac-
tually not, as the necessity of involving a large password space depends on whether
an LRPE scheme has password leakage under a given threat model, which is not
straightforward to decide. In general, there are three possible leakage sources in an
LRPE scheme: the response alone, the challenge-response pair, and the challenge
alone. Among them, the last source has not been well recognized. We use Under-
cover [61] as a counterexample to show that password leakage could happen even
when a secure channel is present.
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Undercover is a typical scheme based on the k-out-of-n paradigm. During reg-
istration, a user is assigned k images as his secret from a pool of n images. In each
authentication round, the user is asked to recognize if there is a secret image from w
candidate images and report the position of that image if the secret image is shown
in the current window; otherwise the user reports the position of the “none” symbol.
Before the user reports the position, a haptics-based secure channel is deployed to
map the real position to a random position decided by the hidden message delivered
via the secure channel.
The hidden mapping blinds the adversary from learning any information from
the response. The authors suggested a small password space is sufficient so that
the default parameters are k = 5, n = 28, and w = 4 + 1 (i.e. four images
and a “none” symbol). The number of candidate root secrets is C528 = 98280.
However, this scheme does not prevent the challenge alone from becoming a source
of leakage. In Undercover, there is at most one secret image among the w candidate
images for each authentication round. This implies a candidate of the root secret is
invalid if two images in this candidate appeared in an authentication round. Since
it has a small candidate space, we can use brute force to recover the secret with
the information from the challenge alone. Figure 3.2 shows how the size of the
candidates shrinks as the number of observed authentication rounds increases. On
average, 53.06 rounds (6 sessions) are sufficient to recover the exact secret, and
the size of the candidate set can be reduced to less than 10 after 43.55 rounds (5
sessions). This result shows that a secure channel alone is not sufficient to prevent
password leakage.
The same problem also appears in the Convex Hull Click (CHC) scheme [72],
where the default parameters are k = 5, n = 112, w = 83. The size of the candidate
set for its root secret is C5112 = 1.34× 108. In our simulation, we are able to recover
the exact secret within 12.28 rounds (2 sessions). Another interesting finding for
CHC is that we can now estimate the average success rate of guessing attack from
the results of brute force attack, though a precise analysis is difficult [72]. According
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Figure 3.2: The average number of valid candidates shrinks for the Undercover
scheme.
to Statement 2, the average success rate is 21.78% = (C5112)
− 1
12.28 . This technique
can also be applied to other complex LRPE schemes to determine their security
strength when the other analysis techniques are infeasible.
3.3.3 P2: Large Round Secret Space Principle
Principle 2: An LRPE scheme with password leakage should have a large candidate
set for the round secret.
This principle emphasizes that a large candidate set for the root secret is nec-
essary but not sufficient to defend against brute force attack. The large candidate
set for the root secret can be broken down based on the attack to the round secrets.
We use Predicate-based Authentication Services (PAS) [10] as a counterexample to
show that a round secret with a small candidate set can be easily recovered and later
used to reveal the root secret.
During registration of PAS, a user is asked to remember p secret pairs, each
of which includes a secret position and a secret word. At the beginning of each
authentication session, the server prompts for an integer index I . Then the user uses
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I to calculate p predicates as follows: For each pair, the corresponding predicate is
the secret position and a secret character. The secret character is the xth character
in the secret word (1-based indexing), where x = 1 + ((I − 1) mod len), and
len is the length of the secret word. For example, given two secret pairs (〈2,3〉,
sente), (〈4,1〉, logig) and I = 15, the predicates are (〈2,3〉, e) and (〈4,1〉, g), where
x = 5 = 1 + ((15 − 1) mod 5), and the secret position 〈a, b〉 means “at row
a and column b”. Given these p predicates, the user examines the cells at secret
positions in l challenge tables to check whether a secret character is present in its
corresponding cell. It yields an answer vector that consists of p · l “present” or
“absent” answers with a candidate space of 2pl. This vector is then used to lookup
another response table, which provides a many-to-one mapping from 2pl elements to
2l elements. Finally, the user inputs one of those 2l elements indexed by the answer
vector to finish an authentication round.
The above many-to-one mapping is used in PAS to confuse the adversary. How-
ever, when the round secret only has a small candidate set, many mappings will
have the same pre-image and the effective mapping space collapses to the candidate
set of the round secret. In PAS, the size of the candidate set for the round secret
is 422500 = (25 × 26)2 for the default parameters, where p = 2, and there are 25
cells in each challenge table and 26 possible letters for the secret character. It is not
difficult to use brute force to recover the round secret of PAS. Figure 3.3 shows the
shrinking of the candidate set size as the number of observed authentication rounds
increases. On average, 9.4 rounds are sufficient to recover the exact round secret (1
session). Since all the predicates generated from the same secret pair share the same
secret position, after recovering the first round secret, it is easy for the adversary to
recover the other round secrets and finally the root secret. A similar attack tech-
nique has been used in [46]. The same problem also appears in the S3PAS scheme
[78], which is a variant of the CHC scheme [72]. In our experiments, we are able to
discover the exact root secret in 8 sessions.
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Figure 3.3: The average number of valid candidates shrinks for the PAS scheme.
3.4 Statistical Attack and Its Defense Principles
3.4.1 Attack Strategy
Statistical attack is an accumulation-based learning process, where an adversary
gradually increases its confidence on relevant targets when more and more cues are
available. Compared to brute force attack, statistical attack has fewer limitations as
it can be applied to schemes with a large password space. Recall that a user response
is statistically biased towards his knowledge of the secret. Theoretically there exists
a specific statistical attack for any password entry scheme. The efficiency of sta-
tistical attack is design-dependent and varies with different schemes and different
analysis techniques. Here we introduce two general statistical analysis techniques
that are able to efficiently extract the root secret of most existing schemes.
The first technique is probabilistic decision tree. It works efficiently for the
existing schemes based on simple challenges [71, 72, 78, 10]. The procedure is
described as follows: 1) Create a score table for each possible individual element
or affordable-sized element group in the alphabet of the root secret, where afford-
able means computational feasible to maintain. We refer to a score table whose
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entry contains t individual elements as a t-element score table. 2) For each inde-
pendent observation of a challenge-response pair, the adversary enumerates every
consistent decision path that leads to the current response. Each possible decision
path is assigned a probability calculated based on the uniform distribution. For the
k-out-of-n paradigm, the probability is p1 = k/n for a decision event in which the
corresponding individual element belongs to the secret set, and p0 = 1 − p1 for
the complementary event. For the example decision path X given in Figure 3.4,
its probability is p(X) = p1 · (p0 · p1). After enumerating all consistent decision
paths, the adversary sums up the probabilities of these paths and uses the sum pc
to normalize the probability p(X) for each decision path to its conditional proba-
bility p(X|C) = p(X)/pc. The conditional probability represents the probability
that a decision path is the path chosen by the user when the current response C
is observed. After the normalization, the adversary updates the score table using
p(X|C). For an entry that appears in a consistent decision path X , its score will
be added by p(X|C) if the corresponding event is that the entry belongs to the se-
cret set, otherwise its score will be deducted by p(X|C). 3) Repeat the above step
until the number of entries with different score levels reaches a threshold (e.g. find-
ing out k entries with the highest/lowest scores when each entry represents a single
element).
The second technique is counting-based statistical analysis. The basic idea
is to simply maintain a counting table for the occurrences of elements. Multiple
counting tables can be maintained simultaneously according to different response
groups. The procedure proceeds as follows: 1) Create l counting tables for l re-
sponse groups. The adversary creates a counting table for each possible response
if affordable. “Any response” is still a useful response group if the secret elements
appear more or less frequently than the decoy elements in the challenge. An en-
try in a counting table can be an individual element or affordable-sized element
group. We refer to a counting table whose entry contains t individual elements as
a t-element counting table. When t ≥ 2, we call this type of statistical analysis as
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A decision path is an emulation of the user’s decision process that consists
of multiple decision nodes. Each decision node represents a decision event
decided by the membership relation of a corresponding entry in the score
table, whether or not it belongs to the secret set.
Consider a scheme which shows a four-element window 〈S1:1, S2:2, S3:1,
D1:1〉 and asks the user to report the sum of the numbers associated with
the first and last secret elements displayed in the window, where Si:x rep-
resents a secret element associated with number x, and Di:y represents a
decoy element associated with number y. Since the correct response for
this challenge is 2 by adding the numbers associated with the first and third
elements, its decision path is X = 〈S1:1〉|〈D1:1; S3:1〉. There are two seg-
ments in this decision path. The first segment implies that S1 is a secret
element, and the second segment implies that D1 is a decoy element and S3
is a secret element. There usually exist other decision paths leading to the
same response, such as 〈S1:1〉|〈D1:1〉.
Figure 3.4: Definition and example for decision path
multi-dimensional counting. 2) For each independent observation of a challenge-
response pair, the adversary first decides which counting table is updated according
to the observed response. Then each entry in the chosen counting table is incre-
mented by the number of occurrences of the corresponding individual element or
element group. If the group of “any response” is used, its counting table is always
updated for each observation. 3) Repeat the above step until the number of entries
with different score levels reaches a threshold (e.g. finding out k entries with the
highest/lowest scores when each entry represents a single element). The score for
an entry is a weighted sum of the count values for the same entry in different tables.
The weight function is dependent on the specific target scheme and the response
grouping strategy.
3.4.2 P3: Uniform Distributed Challenge Principle
Principle 3: An LRPE scheme with password leakage should make the distribution
of the elements in each challenge as uniformly distributed as possible.
This principle requires that an LRPE scheme should be able to generate the
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challenges without knowing the secret1. For example, if there is a structural re-
quirement in the challenge generation, password leakage is very likely to happen.
Non-uniformly distributed elements in a challenge leave cues for the adversary to
recover the secret even without knowing the response. Undercover [61] is a typical
counterexample to show password leakage from biased challenges.
Undercover ensures that the distribution for each image is unbiased by showing
every candidate image exactly once for each authentication session. However, its
2-dimensional distribution is biased in each authentication round, as secret-secret
pairs cannot appear in the challenge (at most 1 secret image appearing). We use
2-element counting table to recover the secret from the challenge. For each pair of
candidate images, the count value is zero only if both of them belong to the secret
set after a sufficient number of observations. On average, it is sufficient to recover
the exact secret within 172.7 rounds (20 sessions), and recover 80% secret elements
(five secret images in total) after 126.9 rounds (15 sessions).
The same problem also appears in the CHC scheme [72] and in the low-
complexity CAS scheme [71]. Both of them require that at least k secret elements
appear in the challenge window, while the challenge window only holds a subset
of candidate elements. These structural requirements make the distribution of the
elements in each challenge deviate from the uniform distribution. Under default
parameters, we are able to recover the exact root secret within 18.18 rounds (2 ses-
sions) for CHC. For the low-complexity CAS scheme, we can recover the exact root
secret (i.e. 60 independent secret images) within 2087.2 rounds (105 sessions), and
recover 90% secret elements within 870.4 rounds (44 sessions).
The above discussion shows that the consequence of the distribution bias caused
by structural requirements in the challenge is subtle to identify and has not been well
recognized. In order to prevent leakage from biased challenges, the distribution of
the elements in each challenge should be indistinguishable from the uniform distri-
1Even if server knows the secret, the secret (or its alternative form, e.g. hash value) should be
only used to verify the response.
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bution. If a structural requirement is compulsory in an LRPE scheme (e.g. at least
k secret elements being displayed) but the element distribution in each challenge is
not uniform when the challenge window only shows a subset of candidate elements,
the scheme should display all the candidate elements in each challenge.
3.4.3 P4: Large Decision Space or Indistinguishable Individual
Principle
Principle 4: An LRPE scheme with password leakage should make each individual
element indistinguishable in the probabilistic decision tree if the candidate set for
decision paths is enumerable.
This principle is critical to limit the feasibility of probabilistic decision tree at-
tack. The power of probabilistic decision tree stems from its emulation of all pos-
sible decision processes leading to the observed response. The emulation creates a
tight binding between each challenge and its response, from which the adversary is
able to extract the subtle statistical difference during the user’s decision if individual
elements are distinguishable on consistent decision paths. It is not easy to make each
individual element indistinguishable, especially when weight or order information
is used in the challenge design. We use the high-complexity CAS scheme [71] as
a counterexample to show how probabilistic decision tree efficiently discovers the
root secret even when a number of decision paths lead to the same answer.
The high-complexity CAS scheme is another typical scheme based on the k-
out-of-n paradigm. During registration, a user is assigned k = 30 images as his
secret from a pool of n = 80 images. In each authentication round, a challenge
is an 8 × 10 grid consists of all the images, one image for each cell. The user is
asked to mentally compute a path starting from the cell in the upper-left corner. The
computation rule is described as follows: Initially the current cell is the cell in the
upper-left corner. If the image in the current cell belongs to the secret set, move
down by one cell, otherwise move right by one cell; if the next moving position is
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out of the grid, it is referred to as an exit position. The path computation ends with
an exit position. The user reports the answer associated with that exit position to
finish an authentication round. The answer is an integer from [0, 3], and is randomly
assigned to each exit position. Since the same answer is assigned to multiple exit
positions (i.e. 4 answers assigned to 18 exit positions), the adversary cannot easily
tell which the exact exit position is. For each exit position, there are also many
possible paths leading to it, which further increases the difficulty for the adversary.
Since the default parameters are large (k = 30, n = 80), brute force attack is
infeasible for this scheme. The scheme also follows Principle 3 to display all the
candidate images in each challenge so that the adversary cannot extract the secret
only by analyzing the challenges. However, each individual element is distinguish-
able in this scheme during the decision process, as each element has different impact
on the transition of decision paths. One can use probabilistic decision tree to recover
the secret from the observations of challenge-response pairs.
Each possible path leading to the observed response forms a decision path in
the probabilistic decision tree. The probability of a decision path is decided by
the movements on this path. For example, a path X = 〈DOWN, RIGHT, RIGHT,
DOWN〉 means the first and the fourth images belong to the secret set, while the
second and third images do not. The probability p(X) is p1 · p0 · p0 · p1, where
p1 = k/n and p0 = 1 − p1. Initially, we create a 1-element score table. Given
a response with the answer i, we enumerate all consistent decision paths leading
to this answer, and update the score table according to the conditional probability
p(X|response = i).
For an 8 × 10 grid specified by the default parameters, there are 43758 possi-
ble decision paths in total, with average path length of 14.5539. For each candidate
image, its score is at a significantly high level if it belongs to the secret set after a suf-
ficient number of observations. Figure 3.5 shows the false positive rate decreasing
along with the increasing number of observed authentication rounds. On average,
it is sufficient to discover the exact secret within 640.8 rounds (65 sessions), and
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discover 90% secret elements after 264.7 rounds (27 sessions). Although the re-
quired number of session observations is larger, it is still possible for the adversary
to collect them using a key logger, and such security strength is achieved only when
the user is able to remember 30 independent secret images.
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Figure 3.5: The average false positive rate decreases for the high-complexity CAS
scheme.
Probabilistic decision tree can also be applied to the low-complexity CAS
scheme [71], the CHC scheme [72], the S3PAS scheme [78], and the PAS scheme
[10]. All of them are based on simple challenges with an enumerable candidate
space for decision paths and the individual element has different impact on the tran-
sition of decision paths.
From these counterexamples, we can see that it is necessary to increase the
number of candidate decision paths if it is infeasible to make each individual ele-
ment indistinguishable in the probabilistic decision tree. The only known designs
that satisfy this indistinguishability requirement are the counting-based schemes
[35, 48]. In those schemes, there is no order or weight information associated with
each candidate element, which usually distinguishes the elements in decision paths.
The user is asked to count their secret elements appearing in the challenge. The
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final response is based on the count value. For these schemes, probabilistic decision
tree attack does not apply, but they may still subject to counting-based statistical
analysis attack.
3.4.4 P5: Indistinguishable Correlation Principle
Principle 5: An LRPE scheme with password leakage should minimize the statisti-
cal difference in low-dimensional correlations among each possible response.
This principle is complementary to Principle 4 to limit the efficiency of
counting-based statistical analysis. Although counting-based statistical analysis is
straightforward, it cannot be completely prevented without a secure channel, as the
user’s response is always statistically biased towards his knowledge of the secret.
In the extreme case, the adversary is able to maintain a counting table to hold
every candidate for the root secret, and update the table according to every avail-
able observation. Using these counting tables, the statistical difference caused by
the knowledge of the secret is always identifiable even when the user is asked to
make intentional mistakes at a predefined probability only known by the server (see
informal proof in Figure 3.6). In this sense, the counting-based statistical analysis
is more powerful than brute force attack if sufficient resources are available to the
adversary.
Proof. Assuming the user makes mistakes in the responses with a fixed
error probability ρ, the average success rate of guessing attack on the “cor-
rect” response for each authentication round is d, the number of candi-
date root secrets is N , the adversary cannot distinguish the true secret only
when the equation 1−ρ
(1−ρ)(Nd−1)+ρ·Nd =
1
N−1 holds, which means the decoys
get the same count value as that of the secret. Solving the equation gives
ρ = 1− d. Therefore, the user should make the correct response with prob-
ability 1− ρ = d. This implies that the user’s decision process is similar to
a random guessing, which defeats the purpose of the authentication.
Figure 3.6: Informal proof for the strength of multi-dimensional counting
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In reality, the resources available to the adversary are not unbounded. The cost
of maintaining t-element counting tables is O(nt), which increases exponentially
with the number of elements t contained in a table entry, where n is the number
of total individual elements. If the adversary fails to maintain a high-dimensional
counting table, the correlation information in these tables is safe from the adversary.
However, it is still possible for the adversary to exploit the low-dimensional corre-
lation to recover the secret. We use SecHCI [48] as a counterexample to show how
it works while brute force and probabilistic decision tree are infeasible.
During registration of SecHCI, a user is assigned k icons as his secret from a
pool of n icons. In each authentication round, the challenge is a window consist-
ing of w icons. The user is asked to count how many secret icons appearing in the
window. After getting the count value x, the user calculates r = b(x mod 4)/2c.
The final response r is either 0 or 1. The challenge is designed so that each individ-
ual candidate has the same probability to appear in the window for either response.
Hence, it is impossible for the adversary to extract useful information based on
1-element statistical analysis.
Since the default parameters are large, k = 14, n = 140, brute force attack
is not applicable. Also because it is a counting-based scheme, it is not subject to
probabilistic decision tree attack according to Principle 4. However, 2-dimensional
counting attack is still applicable. Compared to decoy icons, there are 0.599 more
pairs on average among secret icons for response 0, and 0.599 less pairs on average
among secret icons for response 1. So we can use two 2-element counting tables
to recover its secret, one table for each response. We update the count value for
each pair displayed in each challenge and each response. The score for each entry
is calculated as the value difference between these two tables. For each pair of
candidate icons, the score is at a significantly high level if both of them belong to
the secret set after a sufficient number of observations. Figure 3.7 shows the pair-
based score distribution after 20000 authentication rounds, from which the secret
icons can be easily distinguished. On average, it is sufficient to recover the exact
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secret with 14219.4 rounds (711 sessions), and recover 90% secret elements after
10799.8 rounds (540 sessions). Since SecHCI follows most of our principles, these
numbers are much larger than the schemes we analyzed previously, but it is still far
less secure than it is claimed to be [48]. Its security strength is achieved by imposing
a high cognitive workload where the user is asked to correctly examine 600 icons
(30 icons per round × 20 rounds) one by one for each authentication session.
Figure 3.7: The pair-based score distribution is distorted for the SecHCI scheme.
The first 14 elements are the secret icons, whose pair-based scores are distinguish-
able from the scores of other icons.
The password leakage on pair-based statistics for SecHCI can be fixed by chang-
ing its response function from r = b(x mod 4)/2c to r = x mod 2, where x is
the number of secret icons in the challenge window, but this fix will make SecHCI
subjects to algebraic attack based on Gaussian elimination [48]. This is also the
original motivation of the scheme to use its current function. To further defend
against this algebraic attack, a user has to produce incorrect answers with a fixed er-
ror probability to create noises as suggested in [35]. This certainly further decreases
the scheme’s usability.
Another design limitation on counting-based scheme is that the response func-
tion cannot be in the form of r = x mod q, where q is an integer larger than 2.
In our simulation experiments, we discover that pair-based statistical difference in
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Counting-based LRPE schemes appears when q is larger than 2, and increases with
the value of |r − w · k/n|, where r is the response value, w is the window size, k is
the number of secret elements, and n is the total number of elements. This can be
explained as follows: For a response, if the expected number of secret elements in
a window is less than the expected number w · k/n derived from the uniform dis-
tribution, the number of pairs among secret elements is also less than the expected
number C2wk/n, and the number of pairs among decoy elements is larger than the
expected number derived from the uniform distribution, and vice versa. The ad-
versary is then able to distinguish the secret elements from the other elements by
grouping the observations of different responses. Such attack restricts a counting-
based scheme from using a larger q and thus reducing the number of rounds of an
authentication session without using a more complex response function.
3.5 Usability Costs of Defense Principles
In this section, we provide a qualitative analysis for usability costs of our defense
principles. We show the relation and tradeoff among the constraints imposed by our
principles and the requirements on human capabilities. This section aims to provide
a high level understanding of the quantitative tradeoff analysis to be presented in
the next section.
As defined in Section 3.2, the common parameters of an LRPE scheme is a
tuple (D, k, n, d, w, s). All of the parameters except D (the expected authentication
strength) are affected by our principles. The principles related to brute force attack
mainly dictates the memory demand for the secret, and the principles related to
statistical attack mainly increase the computation workload for each authentication
session. Their impacts are also interrelated.
Principles 1 and 2 require a large candidate set for the root secret and the round
secret. This implies that either k increases or n increases. An increase in k re-
quires the user to memorize more elements as his secret. An increase in n will
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not raise the memory demand, but will increase statistical significance of the secret
in the whole candidate set, which indirectly increases the computation workload
as analyzed later. Principle 2 also directly raises the computation workload, as it
indicates a challenge is not safe against brute force attack if it can be solved by
using a small number of possible secret elements. In order to increase the candidate
space of the round secret, the round secret must be either randomly selected from
the root secret [48, 71, 72] or use all elements in the root secret [35, 6]. The for-
mer choice requires the user to recognize the current displayed secret elements that
change in every round; the latter requires the user to recall a large number of secret
elements that would be difficult when k is large. Finally, more elements appearing
in a challenge means more computation workload to aggregate them into the correct
response. This demands much more effort compared to using a fixed short round
secret in legacy passwords.
Principles 3, 4, and 5 have more impact on (d, w, s). Principle 3 requires that the
elements in the challenge should be uniformly drawn from the candidate set. Due
to previous requirements of large secret space and our preference of minimizing
the memory demand for the secret, the value of k is to be small and the value
of n is to be large. The consequence of this is that the average number of secret
elements displayed in a challenge window, w · k/n, cannot be large enough if the
window sizew is not large. This restricts the number of possible responses to a small
value, which raises the success rate d of guessing attack and increases the round
number required to achieve an expected authentication strength D. On the other
hand, if the window size is large, the LRPE scheme is limited only for large screen
devices and it also increases the difficulty for the user to examine the elements in the
challenge window. Regardless of the window size, this principle imposes increased
computation workload and the error rate for the user. Principles 4 and 5 further
rule out most schemes based on simple challenges. Principle 4 states if a leakage-
resistant challenge design is not complex enough to aggregate a large number of
secret elements into a response, it leads to a counting problem. Principle 5 further
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states that only 0 and 1 can be safely used as the response for a counting problem
if the modular operation is the only operation used to generate the final response.
Hence, the three possible choices for a challenge are: 1) a complex challenge using
many secret elements - the round number will be small but the challenge will be very
difficult for the user to respond (the average length s of decision paths significantly
increased); 2) a counting-based challenge using the modular operation - the round
number will be large and the challenge will be relatively easier to respond; and 3)
a counting-based challenge using a specially designed response function that has a
large number of possible responses and satisfies the correlation indistinguishability
condition; however, it will be a challenge to design such a function with acceptable
usability. All of the three choices impose a considerable burden on the user.
3.6 Quantitative Tradeoff Analysis
In this section, we establish a quantitative analysis framework for evaluating the
usability cost of typical existing LRPE schemes. This framework decomposes the
process of human-computer authentication into atomic cognitive operations in psy-
chology. There are four types of atomic cognitive operations commonly used: sin-
gle/parallel recognition, free/cued recall, single-target/multi-target visual search and
simple cognitive arithmetic. Their performance models characterize the relations
between experiment parameters and reaction time of an average human, which are
used to evaluate the cognitive workload for typical existing LRPE schemes. The re-
sults in this section provide quantitative assessment of the tradeoff between security
and usability of LRPE schemes. According to conventions in psychology literature,
we will refer user as subject in this section.
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3.6.1 Atomic Cognitive Operations
(Single/Parallel) Recognition
Recognition is the process to correctly judge whether a presented item have been
encountered before. Recognition can be considered as a matching process of
comparing presented items with those stored in memory. The reaction time of
a recognition operation depends on the number of items which a subject memo-
rizes. The item set in the subject’s memory is referred to as a positive set. For
single item recognition, that is, only one item is shown to the subject each time,
one of the most well-known recognition models [65] evaluates the reaction time as
RT = 0.3964 + 0.0383 · k, where k is the size of the positive set. When multiple
items are present simultaneously, the subject is able to perform recognition in par-
allel. According to the working memory capacity theory [27, 21, 70], the maximum
number of parallel recognition channels is limited to 4 for an average subject. The
reaction time of recognizing x items displayed simultaneously can be estimated as
RT = (0.3964 + 0.0383 · k) · dx/4e.
Recognition is a common operation in LRPE, which is used by the subject to
judge whether an element appearing in the challenge belongs to the positive set.
The high-complexity CAS scheme [71] is an example for single item recognition,
where the subject is asked to recognize an image in the current position before
deciding which image will be recognized in the next move. The low-complexity
CAS scheme [71] and SecHCI [48] are examples of parallel recognition. In the
low-complexity CAS scheme, the subject needs to find out the first and the last
secret image appearing in a window consisting of 20 images; while in SecHCI, the
subject needs to identify all his secret images among 30 candidate images.
(Free/Cued) Recall
Recall is the other principal method of memory retrieval [8], which is defined as
reproducing the stimulus items. Compared to recognition, the recall process is much
37
slower [22, 55]. The common interpretation of this is that recall is associated with
greater resource costs than recognition [22]. Recall might be carried out as a slow
process of serial search while recognition as a fast process of parallel retrieval [55].
Free recall and cued recall are two basic recall types. In free recall, the subject
is given a list of items to remember and then is tested by recalling them in any order
[57]. In cued recall, the subject is given a list of items with cues to remember, and
cues are given in the test. Cues act as guides to what the person is supposed to
remember. For example, given “a body of water”, the phrase is the cue for the word
“pond” [22]. Many psychological experiments have shown that the reaction time
of free recall increases exponential as the size of positive set increases [57, 69]. In
contrast, the reaction time for cued recall is much shorter and only increases linearly
[22, 55].
Some LRPE schemes require subjects to recall all his secret items during the
authentication. The LPN scheme [35] and the APW scheme [6] are two examples,
where the subject has to recall all the secret items and their corresponding locations
in order to read the challenge digit associated with each secret item. These recall
processes should be classified as free recall as cues are not presented. However, no
experimental data have been provided in psychology literatures for a large positive
set consisted of 15 items required by these schemes, while the common size for a
positive set is 8 for free recall. Since it is difficult to decide whether the exponential
trend still holds when the positive set is large, we use the reaction time of cued recall
as a conservative estimation for free recall used in those schemes. According to the
experimental results in [55, 19], the formula for the reaction time of cued recall is
RT = (0.3964 + 0.0383 · ϕ · γ · k), where ϕ is the ratio of cued recall compared
to single item recognition (ϕ = 1.969 in [55]), while γ is the additional penalty if
subjects are required to simultaneously recalling the position of an item (γ = 1.317
in [19]).
38
(Single-target/Multi-target) Visual Search
Visual search is a perceptual task that involves an active scan of the visual environ-
ment for particular targets among other distractors. The measure of the involvement
of attention in visual search is often manifested as a slope of the response time
function over the number of items displayed (referred to as window size) [73]. For
single-target visual search, searching a single target among a set of items, its reac-
tion time is believed to be linear as the window size increases [74, 73] and can be
estimated as RT = 0.583 + 0.0529 ·w [74], where w is the window size. For multi-
target visual search, the reaction time is accelerated instead of increasing linearly as
the number of targets increases in a fixed-sized window [36].
Visual search is usually used in LRPE schemes based on simple challenges.
PAS [10] and CHC [72] are examples of using single-target visual search and multi-
target visual search, respectively. In PAS, the subject is asked to scan a table cell
containing 13 random letters to check whether a secret letter is present or not. In
CHC, the subject needs to locate 3 secret elements in a window to form a triangle.
According to the results from [36], the reaction time of 3-targets visual search in
CHC is approximately 1.8 times longer than that of single-target visual search in
the same window.
Simple Cognitive Arithmetic
Simple cognitive arithmetic is a mental task to solve simple problems involving ba-
sic arithmetic operations (e.g., 3 + 4, 7 − 3, 3 × 4, 12 ÷ 3). The simple arithmetic
problems can be further divided into three subsets, small, large and zero-and-one
problems [17]. For both addition and multiplication, small problems are defined as
those with the product of two operands smaller than or equal to 25, and large prob-
lems are defined as those with the product of two operands larger than 25. The small
and large problems in subtraction and division are defined on the basis of the inverse
relationships between addition and subtraction and between multiplication and divi-
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sion. Zero-and-one problem is defined as involving 0 or 1 as an operand or answer.
The common instances of zero-and-one problems include counting, exclusive-or,
and mod 2. As reported in the experiments of [17], the average reaction time is
0.773 seconds for small addition, 0.959 seconds for small division, 0.924 seconds
for large addition, and 0.738 seconds for zero-and-one problems.
Simple cognitive arithmetic is usually used in LRPE schemes based on algebra
problems. The counting-based schemes [35, 48] are examples, where the subject is
asked to count the number of secret icons appearing in the challenge, and use the
count value to calculate a response based on a simple algebraic function.
3.6.2 Quantitative Analysis Framework
There are two components in our quantitative analysis framework, Cognitive Work-
load (C) and Memory Demand (M). Cognitive workload is measured by the total
reaction time required by the involved cognitive operations. Long reaction time
for each authentication round implies that it is difficult for the subject to answer
each challenge and the overall error rate is also high. Long reaction time for each
authentication session implies that the overall cognitive workload is high and the
involvement of attention and patience is also high. Memory demand is measured by
the number of elements that must be memorized by the subject, which is the prereq-
uisite of any password entry scheme. Since this prerequisite process is independent
from the authentication process, we consider it as a separate component. Since the
precise relation between overall error rate and total reaction time is difficult to mea-
sure in controlled psychology experiments, our framework provides lower bound
estimation for the usability of a human-computer authentication scheme. The de-
tailed calculation for both components is described as follows.
For cognitive workload, the cost for each authentication round is the sum of
average reaction time for all involved atomic cognitive operations. This cost rep-
resents the average thinking time of a subject required to answer a challenge. A
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typical authentication round consists of at least a memory retrieval operation and
a simple arithmetic operation. For the graphic-based scheme, visual search is also
common. According to the working memory capability theory [57, 21, 70, 69], the
average reaction time is not shortened by repetitive rehearsal, when the subject has
to maintain more than 4(±1) items in his working memory. The rehearsal only im-
proves the accuracy, which represents an inherent limitation of human capabilities.
This limitation is also applied to other non-memory operations such as visual search
when the item positions are shuffled in each challenge [73]. Overall, the cognitive
workload of an authentication session is calculated as the product of the cognitive
workload of an authentication round and the round number when the number of the
secret items is larger than 5. For the schemes [10, 72] with no more than 5 secret
items, we only count once for their memory retrieval operations, assuming that the
secret will not be flushed out due to the limitation of working memory capacity.
Besides the reaction time, other usability measurements for cognitive workload
(such as user frustration level, concentration load, and motivational effort) are usu-
ally collected from standardized testing questionnaires. However, these measure-
ments are susceptible to many implementation and environmental factors, such as
screen size, graphic or text-based interface design, and the education background
of subjects. In contrast, the influence of those unstable factors has been minimized
in more than a century’s development of experimental psychology. So the advan-
tage of using performance models of atomic cognitive operations is that they are
implementation-independent. This property is necessary for a fair comparison be-
tween different LRPE designs. Consequently, our estimation of cognitive workload
is very consistent with the time costs reported in the original papers [48, 71, 72, 10].
For memory demand, the cost for each scheme is a ratio k/λop between the
number of secret items, k, and the accuracy rate of corresponding memory retrieval
operation within a fixed memorization time, λop. Since recognition is much eas-
ier than recall [34, 57, 69, 55, 22], it is necessary to distinguish the difficulty for
different memory retrieval operations. According to [34], λop is 29.6% for recall
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and 84.8% for recognition. A better estimation for the memory demand could be
the minimum time for the subject to remember all the secrets. However, the lower
bound of memorization time is difficult to measure in experimental psychology, as
the subject may not realize the precise time point when he just remembers all the
secrets. An unconfident subject may take more time to rehearsal than that actu-
ally required. Other memory factors, like password interference and recall accuracy
over extended periods, may also be considered but are not integrated in our current
analysis framework.
Finally, an overall score, HP (standing for Human Power), is calculated as the
product of cognitive workload score HP(C) and memory demand score HP(M).
This score (HP) indicates the expected human capability requirement for a human-
computer authentication scheme.
3.6.3 High Security at Cost of Heavy Cognitive Demand
Table 3.1 shows the security strength and HP for the representative LRPE schemes
based on our quantitative analysis framework.
k n
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/round
No. of
rounds
/login
Reported
Time
/round(sec)
HP (C)
/round
(sec)
HP (C)
/login
(sec)
HP (M)
HP Total
=M×C
(×102)
LPN[35] 15 200 200 1.463× 1022 0.50 20 23.71 33.423 668.45 50.68 338.74
APW[6] 16 200 200 8.369× 1024 0.10 6 35.50 57.928 347.57 54.05 187.87
CAS Low[71] 60 240 20 2.433× 1057 0.50 20 5.00 6.073 121.46 70.75 85.94
CAS High[71] 30 80 80 8.871× 1021 0.25 10 20.00 22.099 220.99 35.38 78.18
SecHCI[48] 14 140 30 6.510× 1018 0.50 20 9.00 10.638 212.76 16.51 35.13
CHC[72] 5 112 83 1.341× 108 0.22 10 10.97 9.326 93.26 16.89 15.75
PAS[10] 4 N/A 13 4.225× 105 0.25 10 8.37 6.837 68.37 13.51 9.24
Table 3.1: Tradeoff comparison of representative leakage-resilient password entry
schemes for their default parameters.
Those schemes are listed in the descend order of their HP. All the schemes use
their default parameter values except that the round number is adjusted to make the
successful rate of random guessing to reach the same level (i.e. the authentication
strength of 6-digit PIN). This adjustment is necessary to make a fair comparison
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as they now have the same strength to defend against an adversary without prior
knowledge. The other two points in this table which need explanation are about
PAS [10] and CHC [72]. In PAS, we consider the root secret for each authentication
session as the predicates instead of the complete secret pairs, due to that the same
predicates are used for all the rounds in an authentication. The predicates are the
actual root secret of each authentication session. In CHC, the expected successful
rate of guessing attack is not reported in the original paper. We estimate it based
on Statement 2, which is 21.78% derived from our simulation results. The detailed
computation of the cognitive workload for those schemes is given in Table 3.2.
Atomic Cognitive Operations Calculation of HP (C) per round
LPN[35] Cued-recall with position, counting, mod (0.3964 + 0.0383 · k · ϕ · γ) · k + (k/2− 1) · α0 + 1 · α0
APW[6] Cued-recall with position, large addition, mod ((0.3694 + 0.0383 · k · ϕ · γ) + 1 · α3 + 1 · α0) · k
CAS Low[71] Parallel recognition, xor (0.3694 + 0.0383 · k) · d7.4038/4e+ 1 · α0
CAS High[71] Recognition (0.3694 + 0.0383 · k) · 14.5539
SecHCI[48] Parallel Recognition, counting, mod, small division (0.3694 + 0.0383 · k) · (d30/4e) + 2 · α0 + 1 · α0 + 1 · α2
CHC[72] Cued-recall, Multi-target visual search (3-based) ((0.3694 + 0.0383 · k · ϕ) · 5/10) + (0.583 + 0.0529 · 83) · 1.8
PAS[10] Cued-recall, single-target visual search, small addition (0.3694 + 0.0383 · 2 · ϕ) · 4/10 + (0.583 + 0.0529 · 13) · 4 + 2 · α1
Table 3.2: Detailed computation of cognitive workload for representative leakage-
resilient password entry schemes. α0 = 0.738, α1 = 0.773, α2 = 0.959, α3 = 0.924
are the average reaction time for arithmetic problems involving 0 or 1, small addi-
tion, small division, and large addition correspondingly. ϕ = 1.969 is the ratio
of cued recall compared to single item recognition, while γ = 1.317 is the addi-
tional penalty caused by simultaneously recalling the position of an item. For CAS
Low and High, 7.4038 and 14.5539 are the average lengths of their decision paths,
respectively.
The column “HP(C)/round” in this table shows the cognitive workload required
to solve the challenge in each authentication round. It shows the average thinking
time. All of them except LPN [35] and APW [6] are very close to the average time
cost reported in the original literatures [48, 71, 72, 10]. For LPN, there is no report
on a controlled user study. The scheme is implemented as a public web page, to
which the subjects can freely access and get a reward for each successful login.
There is no evidence showing that the subjects were asked to memorize their root
secret (which are 15 secret positions), and then recall them in each authentication
round. Thus, the average time cost reported for each round is very likely to be
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underestimated, as the recall operations are probably replaced by directly reading
their written-down secrets. For APW, its time cost is directly estimated based on the
results of LPN (with no actual user study conducted), which implies it could also be
underestimated.
This table shows three tiers in these representative schemes. From bottom to
top, the schemes in an upper tier have better security against password leakage at
the cost of lower usability. The schemes at the bottom are PAS [10] and CHC [72],
which are susceptible to both brute force and statistical attacks. When moving to
the middle tier (consisting of CAS [71] and SecHCI [48]), the memory demand
increases to make brute force attack infeasible. However, they are still susceptible
to statistical attack as the simple challenge used in these schemes is not sufficient to
hide the statistical significance of the secret. More cognitive workload is required
to mix the secret items with the other items. The top tier consists of LPN [35]
and APW [6], which follow all of our design principles. They are immune to both
brute force and statistical attacks in practical settings, but impose significantly high
usability cost.
There is an interesting finding when looking at the two schemes in the top tier.
In our quantitative analysis framework, LPN has a higher HP score but a smaller
password space compared to APW. This is because our security measurement is
limited to brute force and two generic statistical attacks. It is still possible to find
out other more efficient attacks that lower the security strength of APW. The tradeoff
relation under our quantitative analysis framework may not strictly follow the order
of HP, as it is always feasible to design a scheme with a lower usability for a given
security strength. But it is required that the human capability should reach a lower
bound so as to achieve a high security strength.
The above results provide quantitative evidence for the inherent limitations in
the design of LRPE. They indicate the incompetence of human cognitive capabilities
in using secure LRPE schemes without a secure channel in practical settings. This
may also explain why the problem is still open since its first proposal [52] twenty
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years ago.
3.7 Discussion
In this work, we provided a comprehensive analysis for the inherent tradeoff be-
tween security and usability in designing a leakage-resilient password entry (LRPE)
schemes. We analyzed the impacts of two types of generic attacks, brute force and
statistical attacks, on the existing schemes designed for unaided humans. Unlike
the specific attacks proposed before (such as SAT [32] and Gaussian elimination
[47]), these two generic attacks, as demonstrated in our work, cannot be mitigated
without involving considerable demand on human capabilities. We introduced five
principles that are necessary to achieve leakage resilience when a secure channel is
unavailable. Usability costs for these principles were analyzed. Our findings indi-
cate that either high memory demand or high cognitive workload is unavoidable in
the design of secure LRPE schemes for unaided humans. To further understand the
tradeoff between security and usability, we established the first quantitative analy-
sis framework on usability costs. Our result shows that there is a strong tradeoff
between security and usability, indicating that an unaided human may not be com-
petent enough to use a secure LRPE scheme in practical settings.
We remark that our quantitative analysis framework is still in its preliminary
stage. We would like to point out two limitations in our current work: 1) Since the
cognitive workload is not totally independent with the memory demand, it is possi-
ble to improve the overall score calculation instead of using the product operation
(i.e. HP= M×C); 2) Error rate is currently not included in our analysis framework
as it is difficult for experimental psychology to provide the general relation between
thinking time and error rate. Certain approximation can be added to improve the
precision of this framework in the future.
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Chapter 4
Usable Leakage-Resilient Password
Entry: Challenges and Design
Metrics
4.1 Introduction
Under the limitations discovered in our first work, this chapter explores the feasibil-
ity of designing practical leakage-resilient password entry (LRPE) schemes with the
assistance of trusted devices. One possible design based on trusted devices is to ask
the users to transcribe the one-time passwords (OTPs) generated by tamper-resistant
hardware tokens [59]. However, the applicability of this technique is limited due to
the considerable costs of manufacturing, distributing, and managing hardware to-
kens for service providers, and the costs of carrying hardware tokens for users. As
a result, most user accounts in the cyberspace are not protected by hardware-based
OTPs. Moreover, hardware-based OTP has its own vulnerabilities such as subject-
ing to theft [51, 16]. In order to prevent such vulnerabilities, a hardware-based OTP
is usually used together with a password, which is still subject to password leakage
attacks.
These limitations motivates the researchers to explore the alternative design
46
based on trusted devices, that is, using a trusted device to forms a secure chan-
nel between user and server. This secure channel ensures that at least part of the
authentication process should be invisible to an adversary so as to prevent password
leakage while maintaining acceptable usability in realistic settings. However, de-
spite of many prior efforts [44, 61, 23, 25, 42, 13, 12], there is still no practical
and widely adopted solution today. This raises a question on the practicability of
adopting a secure channel in password-based authentication.
In this work, we make the first attempt to systematically investigate the chal-
lenges of designing usable LRPE schemes even when a secure channel is available.
We first formalize the authentication process of LRPE schemes and classify exist-
ing schemes into three common design paradigms. We then develop a broad set of
design metrics, which cover three aspects in evaluating LRPE schemes, including
quantitative usability costs with specified security strengths, built-in security, and
universal accessibility. Unlike traditional evaluation metrics, the proposed metrics
are designed to identify the potential limitations of an LRPE scheme in the design
phase before carrying out user studies. These metrics can also be used to dissect a
scheme design into individual design elements, which facilitates a more precise and
fair comparison among the classified schemes.
We apply our design metrics to existing LRPE schemes, which reveals and iden-
tifies their limitations. The major limitations include: 1) the requirement of an
uncommon device feature, 2) the inoperability in certain common scenarios, and 3)
the lack of trusted execution environment. This partially explains why none of these
schemes are widely adopted nowadays. However, it does not necessarily imply that
it is infeasible to design an LRPE scheme that is both secure and practical. Our fur-
ther analysis indicates that it is possible to overcome these limitations by improving
the design according to the proposed metrics.
To summarize, the contribution of this work is three-fold:
• We identify the challenges of designing LRPE schemes and classify existing
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LRPE schemes into three common design paradigms.
• We develop a broad set of design metrics for LRPE schemes, which defines
quantitative relation between security and usability, and extends the scope of
security and usability to include built-in security and universal accessibility.
• We apply the proposed metrics on existing LRPE schemes and reveal that all
the schemes have limitations that could be further improved. Our analysis
provides not only a systematic understanding on existing LRPE schemes, but
also a useful guide for the future research in this area.
4.2 LRPE Problem Overview
In this section, we define the problem of leakage-resilient password entry (LRPE)
and describe its threat model. We also summarize the common design paradigms of
existing LRPE schemes. At last, we provide an overview of our design metrics for
the evaluation of LRPE schemes.
4.2.1 Definitions
In general, an LRPE scheme allows a human user to be authenticated to a (local or
remote) computer server in a secure manner. During registration, user and server
agree on a password, where each element contained in the password is referred to
as a password element. A password element can be an image, a text character, or
any symbol in a notational scheme. The user later uses his knowledge of the pass-
word to generate responses to challenges issued by the server to prove his identity.
This process is referred to as password entry. In the case of legacy passwords, the
user directly enters his plaintext password so that the adversary may capture the
password via various attacks including malware, key logger, and hidden camera.
Password leakage is the threat that a user’s password is directly disclosed or indi-
rectly inferred. The purpose of an LRPE scheme is to establish a leakage-resilient
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environment in order to mitigate or prevent password leakage during password en-
try.
An authentication session of a typical LRPE scheme requires executing multi-
ple rounds of a challenge-response procedure in order to reach an expected authen-
tication strength (e.g., 10−6 resistance against random guessing for 6-digit PIN). A
round secret is a portion of the password which is used for an authentication round.
An authentication scheme is not considered as an LRPE scheme if a user only
transcribes the response generated by a tamper-resistant device [59]. Such a scheme
addresses a different problem which verifies a user to be the person who possesses
the device and is usually used together with legacy passwords or biometrics to mit-
igate the risk of unauthorized access to the device, which may still be subject to the
password leakage threat addressed in the LRPE problem.
4.2.2 Threat Model
Various potential attacks need to be addressed in the design of LRPE schemes. An
adversary may use malware, key logger, or other sophisticated mechanisms to cap-
ture messages delivered between user and server such that the underlying password
can be inferred. Prior proposals on LRPE schemes can be categorized according to
whether or not a secure channel is used in the authentication process. There are quite
a few LRPE schemes in the literature which are designed solely based on human
cognitive capabilities without using any secure channel [35, 48, 71, 72, 10]. How-
ever, all those schemes have failed to be both secure and usable [32, 46, 5, 56, 75]. It
is shown in [75] that an LRPE scheme must rely on the existence of certain secure
channel to achieve both security and usability.
Although it could be difficult to establish a standard secure channel that protect-
ing all the messages delivered between user and server, it is possible for an LRPE
scheme to utilize a partial secure channel. The requirement of a partial secure
channel is weaker than a standard secure channel, as it only requires that a portion
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of messages delivered between user and server be invisible to an adversary. For
example, the use of a partial secure channel may ensure that the leakage resistance
of an LRPE scheme is preserved even after allowing an adversary to observe most
messages during password entry as long as certain critical messages are not dis-
closed. A partial secure channel is usually unidirectional either from server to user
or from user to server.
In the presence of a partial secure channel, it is possible to achieve the optimal
security objective, no password leakage during password entry. No password leak-
age with a partial secure channel means that if the portion of messages protected by
the partial secure channel are not disclosed, a secure LRPE scheme should provide
the same leakage resilience as one-time pad [54], where the most efficient attacks
for an adversary to learn the password are online dictionary attacks. This study
focuses on LRPE schemes using such a partial secure channel and excludes LRPE
schemes without using any form of secure channel unless explicitly mentioned.
There are LRPE schemes in the literature based on weak threat models, where
the requirements of secure channels are not precisely specified. An example of
such schemes considers the threat of cognitive shoulder-surfing [58, 26], where the
adversary is assumed be not able to observe the entire password entry due to his
cognitive limitations; however, it is not clear what is the exact part of password
entry that is invisible to the adversary. We exclude these schemes in our discussion.
In addition to the attacks mentioned at the beginning of this subsection that hap-
pen during password entry, password leakage may also be caused by other types of
attacks, such as social engineering, phishing or even non-technical attacks such as
dumpster diving [49]. Although their mitigation technologies such as secure URL
checker and spam filter have become standard components of modern computer
systems, some of these attacks may not be completely preventable by technical
solutions alone and are orthogonal to the password entry problem. Another exam-
ple is the database reading attack, where the adversary intrudes into the back-end
databases to compromise all user passwords. These attacks are out of the scope of
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this work.
4.2.3 Common Design Paradigms
As analyzed in the previous subsection, it is necessary for a practical LRPE scheme
to use a partial secure channel. The key idea of an LRPE scheme with a partial se-
cure channel is to hide certain messages during password entry from the adversary.
These hidden messages break the correlation between the password and the infor-
mation observable to the adversary so that the adversary will not be able to infer the
password. The three common paradigms are described as follows (see Figure 4.1):
User Server
Suppose a user is going to 
input digit as the first
character of his password.
+ 2 mod 10 = ?
8
Hidden
Transformation
2 ?
NO
NO
YES
Hidden
Confirmation
What is the first digit?
6
Hidden
Response
A hidden message delivered
in a partial secure channel
A message observable 
to an adversary
Legend
First digit
Is the first digit
7 ?Is the first digit
6 ?Is the first digit
Figure 4.1: Examples of LRPE schemes following three common design paradigms.
For a message contains both white and grey boxes, only the message in the white
part is observable to an adversary, while the message in the grey part is delivered
via a partial secure channel. Take “First digit + 2 mod 10 = ?” as an example. An
adversary knows a user’s next input is related to the first digit in the password, but
he does not know the hidden transformation, which is “+ 2 mod 10”. Thus, even
if the adversary observes the answer 8, he is not able to infer the entered password
element, which is 6.
1. Hidden transformation (HT): Hidden transformations are delivered via a
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partial secure channel from server to user. A hidden transformation is a part
of a challenge, which transforms a password element into another form that
is not correlated with the original password element if the question itself is
not disclosed. The correct response for each password element is calculated
according to both the corresponding password element and the hidden trans-
formation.
2. Hidden confirmation (HC): Hidden binary questions are delivered via a par-
tial secure channel from server to user. These questions enumerate all possi-
ble candidate elements in the password alphabet in a random order. A user
answers Yes/No to the question depends on whether the password element he
wants to input appears in the question. Multiple confirmation questions are
usually required for inputting a single password element.
3. Hidden response (HR): The entire response is delivered over a partial secure
channel from user to server. An instance following this paradigm is a keypad
fully covered by a glove. If the vision channel from the outside of the glove
is the only way that the adversary can observe the password entry, the glove
forms a partial secure channel that hides all the user inputs from the adversary.
The first two paradigms take the strategy of hiding the challenges, while the last
paradigm hides the responses. Referring to Figure 4.1 again, intuitively, a scheme in
these paradigms will be secure as long as the messages (shown in the grey boxes) de-
livered via the corresponding partial secure channel are not disclosed. The detailed
characteristics of these paradigms will be analyzed together with the corresponding
design metrics introduced in the following sections.
4.2.4 Design Metrics Overview
Our design metrics characterize and assess the major design factors in LRPE
schemes, which are organized in three different aspects and introduced in the fol-
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lowing three sections, respectively. The first aspect is related to two key security
features of an LRPE scheme, password space and leakage resistance. A large pass-
word space is an essential requirement for any secure password scheme. The size
of password space generally increases at the expense of users’ memory effort. The
second security feature, leakage resistance, relates to both the cognitive workload
and the resistance property of interaction channels. Higher leakage resistance of an
LRPE scheme usually implies either a higher cognitive workload or a higher de-
ployment cost of interaction channels. The first aspect of our metrics addresses the
quantitative relations between these two security features and their associated costs.
As shown in Figure 4.2, these design factors are marked with section numbers 4.3.1,
4.3.2, and 4.3.3. Our research in this aspect gives the lower bound condition for us-
ability costs to achieve a given security strength, but it does not provide guarantee
to ensure that the security strength is not affected by user behavior. This problem
is addressed in the second aspect of our metrics, build-in security, as shown in the
design factors marked with section numbers 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 in Figure 4.2. The last
aspect extends the scope of usability to universal accessibility. We examine how
the variety and availability of users’ capabilities, devices, and other environmental
factors influence the practicability of LRPE schemes, as shown in the design factors
marked with section numbers 4.5.1, 4.5.2, and 4.5.3 in Figure 4.2.
4.3 Relations between Security Strength and Usabil-
ity Costs
The relation between security and usability is not necessarily a strict tradeoff. It
is possible to improve security without sacrificing usability if it does not reach the
usability lower bound for a given security strength. We discuss the usability costs
associated with the key security features of LRPE schemes below.
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Figure 4.2: Major design factors in LRPE schemes
4.3.1 Password Space and Memory Effort
A large password space is an important security feature against brute force attacks,
where large means it is computational infeasible for an adversary to enumerate all
possible candidates in a practical setting. Given an alphabet with n elements and a
password length k, the password space reaches the maximum size nk if each pass-
word is a random ordered sequence that allows duplicate elements. Otherwise the
password space will be smaller than nk, which means the security strength against
brute force attacks can be improved for the usability cost of memorizing a k-length
password. A space-memory ratio metrics is defined to characterize the relation be-
tween a password space and users’ memory effort.
Space-Memory Ratio (SMR): Given an alphabet with n elements and a password
length k, a space-memory ratio is the size of the password space divided by pass-
word length k.
The maximum value of SMR is nk/k. Given a specific resistance against brute
force attacks (i.e. a specific size of the password space), a higher value of SMR
means the less memory effort for users. We use the Undercover scheme [61] as
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an example for SMR calculation. A password in this scheme consists of 5 distinct
images to achieve the authentication strength of 4-digit PIN. According to its design,
the size of its password space is Ckn for memorizing k distinct images from a pool
of n images. Thus, its SMR value is Ckn/k.
Figure 4.3: Password composition of the Undercover scheme [61]
The definition of SMR does not distinguish two primary memory retrieval oper-
ations – recall and recognition1. Given the same password length, recall is usually
slower than recognition [22] when the elements in the password are independent
such that the user has to memorize them individually. If the user is able to find out
the logical relation between these elements and memorize them as chunks, the dif-
ference between recall and recognition is no longer significant. This effect is called
chunking in psychology [31]. It is also possible for the user to perform a faster re-
call than recognition if a simple logical relation exists in the password required by
recall but does not exist in another password required by recognition. For example,
if 2047 is the room number of a user’s apartment, it could be easier for him to recall
it as his 4-digit PIN, compared with recognizing 5 distinct images shown in Fig-
ure 4.3. Therefore, recognition is not always an easier choice compared to recall.
Likewise, SMR does not distinguish the types of elements, e.g. text characters or
images, as their difference cannot be deterministically characterized. Despite these
differences, a shorter password generally implies less memory effort.
On the other hand, a longer password does not necessarily imply high guessing-
resistance, but it is the essential requirement for a larger password space. A recent
research [41] shows that a longer password without any other composition restric-
1Memory recall and recognition are the two principal methods of memory retrieval [8]. Recall is
defined as reproducing the stimulus items; Recognition is the process to correctly judge whether a
presented item have been encountered before.
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tion tends to have a higher guessing-resistance in real life compared to a shorter
password with a complex composition policy. Therefore, the password space cal-
culated based on the password length also provides a reasonable estimation for the
effective resistance against brute force attacks.
4.3.2 Leakage Resistance and Cognitive Workload
No password leakage is the major security objective of LRPE schemes. We now
discuss the requirements to achieve no password leakage for the three common
paradigms given in Section 4.2.3.
In the hidden transformation (HT) paradigm, an adversary should not be able to
learn any information from the following five leakage sources: the challenge alone,
the response alone, the hint alone, the challenge-response pair, and the challenge-
hint pair. Here a hint means a hidden transformation, which is a part of a challenge
that assists the user to calculate the final response. For example, a hint could be a
transformation like “plus 2 mod 10” as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Note that it is pos-
sible for the adversary to access the hint by attempting to use the LRPE scheme as
the scheme always shows the hint during authentication. It is thus required that the
hint should not be embedded with any knowledge about the underlying password.
We derive the following necessary conditions for an LRPE scheme in the HT
paradigm to achieve no password leakage:
No-Leakage Conditions: Let X ti = {xi1, . . . , xit} be a set of t elements that may
appear in a challenge, Pr(X ti |cm) be the probability that all the elements in X ti ap-
pear together in a challenge cm, Pr(hi|cm) be the probability that a hint hi appears
with a challenge cm, and Pr(ri|cm) be the probability that a response ri appears
with a challenge cm, the following rules must be satisfied so as to achieve no pass-
word leakage.
1. Uniform-distribution rule2: For any i, j, m, t ∈ Z+, Pr(X ti |cm) =
2When t = 1, this rule means each single element is uniformly distributed in the challenge.
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Pr(X tj |cm), Pr(hi|cm) = Pr(hj|cm), and Pr(ri|cm) = Pr(rj|cm)
2. Zero-correlation rule: For any i, j, k, m, t ∈ Z+, Pr(X ti |cm, rk) =
Pr(X tj |cm, rk) and Pr(X ti |cm, hk) = Pr(X tj |cm, hk)
The uniform-distribution rule ensures that the challenge alone, the response
alone, and the hint alone do not leak any information related to the underlying
password. The zero-correlation rule further prevents password leakage from the
challenge-response pair and the challenge-hint pair. The only remaining source is
the correlation between responses and hints, which is protected by the partial secure
channel from the server to the user.
LRPE schemes in the other two paradigms, hidden confirmation (HC) and hid-
den response (HR), are always able to achieve no password leakage if the corre-
sponding partial secure channels are not compromised. Specifically, for the HR
paradigm, the entire response should be delivered via the partial secure channel.
We use the VibraPass scheme [25] as a counterexample to show how password
leakage happens when no-leakage conditions are not satisfied. This scheme is in
the HT paradigm, which utilizes the vibration function of an extra mobile phone
to construct a secure haptic channel. A password in this scheme consists of k text
characters. To enter a k-length password, extra l lie rounds are added. In each
lie round, a user is asked to input a random character instead of the next correct
character that he is supposed to input. The user knows the current round is a lie
round when he feels his mobile phone vibrating. The total round number is k + l,
where the positions of l lie rounds are randomized in all k+ l rounds. For example,
given a password 1234 and a round sequence “0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0” where 1 means a lie
round and 0 means a normal round, the user should input “1, x, 2, 3, y, 4” to pass
the authentication, where x and y are two random digits. This scheme does not
satisfy the uniform-distribution rule. The underlying password characters must
appear in the response every time while the other fake characters may not. So
When t = 2, this rule means each pair of elements also uniformly appears in the challenge.
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the condition Pr(ri|cm) = Pr(rj|cm) does not hold, where ri and rj are a user’s
responses of inputting individual characters. An adversary can simply maintain a
counting table to count the frequencies of individual characters appearing in the
responses, and then infer the password by reconstructing the order among the most
frequent characters.
Since no password leakage is achievable, we do not consider other weaker se-
curity objectives in the following discussion but focus on measuring the cogni-
tive workload to accomplish this objective. A recent work [75] provides a quan-
titative analysis framework for the usability costs of an LRPE scheme without a
partial secure channel. The framework divides the authentication procedure of an
LRPE scheme into a sequence of atomic cognitive operations that can be quanti-
tatively measured based on the results from experimental psychology. We adapt
this methodology and define a cognitive operation list metric to estimate a user’s
cognitive workload.
Cognitive Operation List (COL): Given an LRPE scheme that requires a user to
solve m challenges where each of them consists of s atomic cognitive operations, a
cognitive operation list contains all s ∗m atomic cognitive operations involved in
a successful authentication.
Since the amount of mental effort for the same atomic cognitive operation may
vary with different users, this metric only enumerates all the operations. It is dif-
ficult to derive a consistent metric that calculates a more quantitative value based
on this list. For example, a metric that merely calculates the total number of oper-
ations may not be useful as the overall cognitive workload of a shorter COL could
be higher than the workload of a longer COL. Nonetheless, for the schemes using
similar types of cognitive operations, a COL with fewer operations generally im-
plies a lower cognitive workload. For the HT paradigm, the minimal value of s is
3, which involves one operation of reading the hint from the partial secure chan-
nel, one memory retrieval operation for the round secret, and one simple cognitive
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calculation for response obfuscation. For the HC paradigm, the minimal value of s
is 1 + n/2, where 1 is for the recall of the round secret and n is the size of pass-
word alphabet. n/2 is the expected number of recognitions that are required to
confirm the correct round secret from a random ordered list. For the HR paradigm,
the minimal value of s is 2, which involves one recall of the round secret and one
response by operating the partial secure channel. Among these three paradigms, the
HR paradigm may have the shortest COL, which also has the highest requirement
on the availability of partial secure channels as analyzed in Section 4.6. Compared
to the HC paradigm, the HT paradigm has an advantage to support a large alphabet
under the same usability cost, which makes it easier to scale up to a large password
space.
We use the PhoneLock scheme [12] as an example for COL enumeration. This
scheme is in the HC paradigm, where a headset is utilized to construct a secure
acoustic channel (see Figure 4.4). A password in this scheme is a PIN. When a
user presses on a specific cue region on the ring, the headset will play a random
spoken number picked from 0 to 9. If the user hears a number he wants to input, he
selects that number by pressing the circle in the center, and then finishes the current
authentication round. The mappings between spoken numbers and cue region posi-
tions are reshuffled in each round and remain fixed within each round. According to
its design, in each round, 1 recall for the round secret (i.e. the next number a user is
supposed to input) is required and n/2 cue regions on average have to be explored
in order to find the current round secret from an n-sized alphabet. Thus, the COL of
this scheme contains 1 + n/2 operations described above for each round, and these
operations repeat m times for a successful authentication session.
Since the length of COL also depends on the round numberm (i.e. the number of
challenges), it is possible to further reduce the cognitive workload if we can reduce
m for a given authentication strength. Such issue will be addressed by another
metric, screen utility rate, which is introduced in Section 4.5.
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Figure 4.4: The usage of the PhoneLock scheme [12]
4.3.3 Effectiveness and Costs of Interaction Channels
The choice of interaction channels between user and user interface may have a sig-
nificant influence on the efficiency of the authentication process of LRPE schemes.
From users’ perspective, three types of interaction channels are used in a typical
LRPE scheme, which include public input channels for challenge, partial secure
channels for a user either to receive inputs or to provide outputs, and public output
channels for response. A good interaction channel for an LRPE scheme should sat-
isfy two requirements: 1) it has a high bandwidth for efficient message delivery, and
2) it has high reliability and minimum demand on human capabilities so that human
beings can use it easily in various environments. In addition, a channel is further re-
quired to be difficult for the adversary to compromise if it is used as a partial secure
channel.
Existing user interfaces require that a user gets inputs from vision [42, 44, 23,
61, 25], acoustics [12], or haptics [13], and provide outputs via acoustics or mo-
tion [42, 44, 23, 61, 25, 12, 13]. For the input channel, evidences from psychol-
ogy show that vision is the fastest channel to reliably collect information for non-
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blind users. This phenomenon is called as visual dominance. In perception and
information processing, vision has been shown to dominate over acoustics [18]
and haptics [29]. For the output channel, motion is shown to be a more reliable
and faster channel compared to the acoustics channel as average human beings
have better control over body, especially hand, than sound [66] and it has better
resistance against environmental noises. Among all the possible motions, click-
ing [42, 61, 25, 12, 13] is the simplest which only requires the user to move one
finger without a high precision control as required by other motions like shaking in
a specific way. Hence, the optimal choice for interaction channels in a general sense
is vision for input, and clicking for output. Any other choice for interaction channels
may be considered low efficiency unless they are designed for specific application
scenarios.
In realistic settings, an interaction between user and user interface may be cap-
tured through multiple leakage channels from an adversary’s perspective. For ex-
ample, a clicking action on a keypad may be intercepted from the vision channel
(where the adversary installs a hidden camera) and from the haptic channel (where
the adversary installs a sensitive haptic board above the original keypad). There-
fore, a secure LRPE scheme should protect all these channels that may potentially
cause password leakage. Considering an LRPE scheme that uses a glove to protect
password entry, since an adversary can steal the password by watching the pass-
word entry or installing an external key logger, the mere act of blocking the vision
channel by a glove is not sufficient.
Since a user’s interaction channel may correspond to multiple leakage channels,
all these leakage channels should be transformed into partial secure channels by the
design of LRPE schemes. Although it is difficult to judge the leakage resistance of
these partial secure channels in a general setting, the risk of password leakage can
be reduced if a fewer number of partial secure channels are involved in a scheme
design. The list of partial secure channels required by an LRPE scheme provides
an estimation for the reliability of the scheme. We consider a scheme having higher
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reliability if it involves fewer partial secure channels and its partial secure channels
have higher resistance against password leakage. In Section 4.5, we will discuss
other factors related to interaction channels, including 1) the human capability re-
quirements for operating an interaction channel, and 2) the availability of required
device features.
4.4 Built-in Security
Built-in security requires that the security strength of an LRPE scheme should not
rely on user behavior. If a scheme requires a user to perform an optional action to
achieve its security strength, this security strength is unreliable as the user may not
act appropriately due to the inconsistency with personal habits and the sensitivity
on violations of social norms.
4.4.1 Inconsistency with Personal Habits
Most users do not have the habit of thinking of security first. Security mechanism
such as user authentication is usually a minor task for users. What users care most
is obtaining services after authentication [24].
There are two common inconsistencies between users’ habits and security de-
sign. The first one is impatience, which means a user may not perform any op-
tional actions which he is supposed to perform. Some common optional actions
such as reading a manual, and checking the integrity of input device may make
users impatient. A typical example is Error-Correcting-Challenge [35], which is
the only existing scheme that is designed to defend against an active adversary.
The adversary is allowed to arbitrarily manipulate the environment for password
entry, such as modifying a challenge issued by a legitimate server. This scheme
requires a user to verify the integrity of a challenge by solving linear equations
before answering the challenge. A challenge in this scheme consists of w × h
squares, where each square contains 10 × 10 digits. The digits in each square
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are generated by a formula L(x, y) = ax + by + c mod 10, where L(x, y) is
the digital value at location (x, y). a, b, and c are three random digits drawn
uniformly for the current square. A user is asked to test the linearity of these
digits in every square by choosing a random point (x, y) and a random offset r
and checking whether L(x, y) = L(x + r, y) − L(r, y) + L(0, y) mod 10 or
L(x, y) = L(x, y + r) − L(x, r) + L(x, 0) mod 10. The user will answer the
challenge only after the challenge passed a sufficient number of linearity tests on
all 100wh digits. During this process, a user may become impatient due to the high
cognitive workload.
The second inconsistency is about users’ inability of generating random num-
bers [7], where certain LRPE schemes rely on users to make random choices. For
example, the LPN scheme [35] asks a user to calculate the responses by two dif-
ferent algorithms A and B, respectively. Given a challenge, with probability η, the
user randomly picks algorithm A; otherwise he uses algorithm B. The user passes
the authentication if the ratio of correct responses generated by algorithm A is not
smaller than η. The leakage resistance of this scheme relies on the randomness in
users’ choices between two algorithms, which may be significantly undermined if a
user always follows a fixed pattern to choose these two algorithms. However, it is
usually difficult for average users to make such “random” choices specified by the
scheme design.
User education will alleviate the problem to some extent, but the outcome is
uncertain. A user may still make mistakes or be overconfident. Any LRPE scheme
with high reliability in security should not rely mainly on user education. It is
necessary to convert optional actions into compulsory actions if they are critical to
secure LRPE schemes.
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4.4.2 Violations of Social Norms
Social norms are also common concerns impeding a user from performing certain
optional protection actions. A recent field study on ATM usage [24] found that a
user is not willing to shield a keypad if he is accompanied by his friends. The user
may think that a shielding gesture would be misinterpreted as a sign of distrust to his
friends. This situation is more likely to happen among users who have an intimate
relation with each other. Social norms may vary with different cultures, but their
impact on LRPE schemes is similar, which may prevent users from performing
certain optional protection actions required by LRPE schemes. Hence, a secure
LRPE scheme should make necessary actions mandatory so as to achieve security
objectives. This is also a solution to avoid potential misinterpretation on social
norms.
The ShieldPin scheme [42] is an example that addresses this issue. The keypad
in this scheme appears only when the protective gesture is being detected by the
touchscreen (see Figure 4.5). Once a user raises his hand from the touchscreen, the
keypad will immediately disappear so that password entry is always protected by
the required action.
Figure 4.5: User interface in the ShieldPin scheme [42]
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4.5 Universal Accessibility
Universal accessibility is intended to benefit the majority of users in the design of
LRPE schemes. Specifically, it requires a scheme to be accessible even in a non-
ideal environment such as situations when a user is not able to use all his capabilities
or when environmental noise is high. Traditional laboratory user study that only
considers ideal environment for unhampered users may not be sufficient to fully
evaluate the usability of LRPE schemes in practice. We discuss three general aspects
of universal accessibility below.
4.5.1 Beneficiary Scope
Beneficiary scope specifies who has the capabilities to use an LRPE scheme. The
success of legacy passwords is largely attributed to its wide beneficiary scope, as it
imposes minimum requirement on human capabilities in a general sense. Anyone
who can see and move a single finger can use legacy passwords. A narrower ben-
eficiary scope means some current users of legacy passwords cannot use the LRPE
scheme. A practical LRPE scheme should attempt to preserve a similar beneficiary
scope. Any LRPE scheme that requires extra human capabilities may not be appeal-
ing to the majority.
For example, the PressureGrid scheme [42] requires precise cooperation of mul-
tiple fingers (see Figure 4.6). To select a specific cell, a user is asked to apply ad-
ditional pressure on one specific finger per hand. This operation could be difficult
especially for elders, children, and those with physical (not cognitive) disability
such as a person who loses one of his fingers.
4.5.2 Device Availability
Any LRPE scheme runs with at least one device, where the user uses a system pro-
tected by the LRPE scheme. This device is referred to as the primary device. Some
existing LRPE schemes [12, 25] also require an extra device to form a partial secure
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Figure 4.6: The usage of the PressureGrid scheme [42]
channel, which is referred to as the secondary device. The use of secondary device
lowers device availability, even if the device is free of charge. This is because the
secondary device must be carried by users and it subjects to extra risks such as theft,
which in turn may cause security or accessibility problems. A good design should
avoid the use of secondary device and focus on reusing the existing features of the
primary device. Since device features evolve with time, it is possible to support
more advanced security properties when the required features become available.
Even if a primary device is equipped with sufficient features to support an LRPE
scheme, it usually has its own functional limitations. For example, the most pop-
ular mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets are usually equipped with a
small screen. Therefore, one may not expect a primary device be equipped with a
large screen like desktop computers. We define screen utility rate as an important
indicator for the requirement on the primary device.
Screen Utility Rate (SUR): Given a screen with N cells for displaying individual
elements in a challenge of an LRPE scheme, which has a probability of ρ for the ad-
versary to use random guessing to find the correct response on average, the screen
utility rate is 1/ρ
N
. Control elements such as finish button and backspace button are
not counted in N.
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The maximum value is 1.0 when ρ = 1/N . A higher value of SUR indicates
a lower requirement on the screen size for achieving the specified authentication
strength after each challenge. This metric characterizes how efficient an LRPE
scheme is able to achieve certain security strength with a fixed-sized screen. A
high value of SUR results in a small number of rounds in authentication, which
makes it easier to adapt to small-screen devices. Although a larger value of SUR
may not necessarily implies a better usability, but it address the design restriction
from the screen size, which is also directly related to the form factor of the device.
This metric raises the awareness of reducing unnecessary visual redundancy in the
LRPE schemes as illustrated by the counterexample of the PAS scheme [10]3 (see
Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.7: Visual redundancy in the PAS scheme [10]
3Since the PAS scheme [10] does not use a partial secure channel, it is only used as a counterex-
ample here, but will not be included in the analysis in Section 4.6.
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4.5.3 Environmental Adaptation
Laboratory user study is usually conducted in a quiet room and the user is given
sufficient time to perform a single task in each test. However, this may not be
the case in daily usage. Users may act differently when they do not have peace
in mind or stay in a quiet room. Below we summarize common environmental
metrics which affect users’ perception of security. 1) Impact of time pressure: a
user tends to act hastily under time pressure, which may lead to mistakes. 2) Impact
of distraction: unexpected distraction interferes with a user’s mind when answering
challenges. 3) Impact of mental workload: mental workload consistently interferes
with a user’s mind during answering challenges. 4) Impact of environmental noise:
environmental noise may render certain interaction channels such as acoustics and
haptics imprecise or even unusable. An example of haptics-based user interfaces
illustrated in Figure 4.8 requires a stationary environment for a user to precisely
feel haptic inputs. 5) Impact of hampered capability: a user’s capability may be
hampered even if he is not handicapped. For example, a user may only use one hand
in authentication when he uses the other hand to carry a bag. These environmental
metrics are important in the evaluation of LRPE schemes so as to obtain credible
results in real-world scenarios. Among these metrics, only the last two metrics can
be measured in the design phase, which are used to evaluate existing schemes. The
first three metrics will be discussed in Section 5.6.
4.6 Using the Metrics: Evaluation of Existing LRPE
Schemes
In this section, we apply our design metrics to representative LRPE schemes [44,
61, 23, 25, 42, 13, 12] that attempt to establish a partial secure channel between user
and server. Table 4.1 shows the results of our analysis.
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Figure 4.8: User interface of the HapticKeypad scheme [13]
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In Table 4.1, m is the round number required to achieve a specific authentica-
tion strength. The value of m is decided by the screen utility rate (SUR). Given
a fixed-size screen, a larger value of SUR generally implies a smaller value of m.
The “cognitive operation list” column only lists the cognitive operations for one
challenge, and these operations are repeated in all m challenges. The total number
of operations for a successful authentication session is given in the square brack-
ets at the end of the operation list. There is an exception in this column for the
VibraPass scheme [25]. For this scheme, the full operation list is given, and the
total round number is m + l, where m is the number of rounds for inputting all the
characters in the password and l is the number of extra lie rounds for confusing the
adversary. More details about this scheme can be found in the example described in
Section 4.3.2. In the “interaction channels” column, letter I or O in the parentheses
indicates a channel is used by a user to get inputs or to provide outputs respectively.
The “extra device” column describes whether it requires a secondary device for user
authentication. The “device feature” column shows the special features required by
the primary device and the secondary device if it exists. “Fine” in the “environ-
mental adaption” column means there are no foreseeable extra environmental re-
strictions on scheme usage compared to legacy passwords. “Unusable/unstable in
shaking” means the effectiveness of a scheme is significantly impacted if it is used
in a non-stationary environment. The table does not include the metrics related to
built-in security, as all these schemes do not require users to perform any optional
actions.
4.6.1 Paradigm Level Analysis
The schemes [42, 44, 23] in the hidden response (HR) paradigm require a special
device feature such as gaze tracker, or a special gesture such as hand shielding to
hide authentication responses. There are several limitations for the practicability of
these schemes, including: 1) the special device feature required may not be univer-
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sally available; 2) it may require extra human capability to operate the device; 3)
the special device feature may not be operable in certain environments; 4) the ges-
ture may not be able to protect all the leakage channels supposed to be protected.
For example, the hand shielding gesture used in the ShieldPIN scheme [42] merely
blocks the adversary’s vision channel. However, it is still possible for the adversary
to exploit the haptic channel that is not protected by the gesture. Although an exter-
nal key logger for a touchscreen has not been observed in the wild, it is technically
feasible to implement it like other hardware key loggers [64]. Considering that the
thickness of the touchscreen in Samsung Galaxy S3 is just 1.1mm [3], a user may
not be able to notice such difference if an extra hardware “touch” logger is installed
above a normal touchscreen. So an extra partial secure haptic channel needs to be
added to protect click operations for the ShieldPIN scheme [42], though this channel
is not addressed in the original design. For a similar reason, an extra secure vision
channel is added for the PressureGrid scheme [42] in Table 4.1.
The schemes [13, 12] in the hidden confirmation (HC) paradigm rely on the
leakage resistance property of acoustic or haptic channel. It is relatively easy to
protect such a channel. However, an inherent limitation on the usability of these
schemes is that the cognitive workload increases linearly with the size of password
alphabet, as it requires users to enumerate a list of randomly-ordered questions and
confirm whether a password element appears in an enumerated question.
Compared to the other two paradigms, the hidden transformation (HT) paradigm
has an advantage in that the partial secure channel delivers only a transformation
(referred to as hint) for each challenge. The hint alone does not leak any information
about the password, which maps a fixed round secret to a random response. If the
hint is not revealed together with the corresponding response, it is impossible for an
adversary to derive any valuable information about the password. The usability cost
of this paradigm is more scalable compared to the HC paradigm, as the cognitive
workload of each challenge is asymptotically constant for arbitrary-sized password
alphabet.
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4.6.2 Scheme Level Analysis
In Table 4.1, we use grey color to indicate noticeable costs discovered in the ex-
isting schemes. These costs could be reduced for a scheme utilizing the same de-
sign elements (e.g. interaction channels, device features, etc). For example, the
SUR value is 0.5 for the CuePin scheme [42] as illustrated in Figure 4.9, which
implies this scheme requires doubled screen space compared to another scheme
whose SUR value is 1.0 if they are using the same size for individual visual ele-
ments. This change does not necessarily imply that a scheme with a larger SUR has
a better usability, but it does imply that it will be easier to adapt such a scheme into
small-screen devices like smartphones which are perceived to be the most pervasive
computing devices in the near future.
Figure 4.9: SUR calculation for the CuePin scheme [42]
The results show that all of these schemes have grey fields, which indicates they
can be improved in different aspects. Their major limitations can be summarized
as 1) requiring an uncommon device feature, or 2) inoperable in certain common
scenarios. We also notice that a few LRPE schemes still have password leakage
though they are equipped with partial secure channels. For example, two schemes
in the HT paradigm do not satisfy the no-leakage conditions given in Section 4.3.2,
due to non-uniform distribution of challenges [61] or responses [25].
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Table 4.1 does not highlight all the differences among these schemes, as some of
them may not be directly comparable. These differences include those given in met-
rics named “cognitive operation list”, “interaction channels”, “partial secure chan-
nels”, and “required human capabilities”. Since different users may have different
preferences and skills to perform these operations, and the effectiveness of these
interaction channels also depends on the application scenarios, it is hard to claim
that one scheme is absolutely better than another from the aspects characterized by
those metrics. In particular, for the cognitive operation list (COL) metrics, although
the schemes in the HC paradigm have a longer COL compared to the schemes in
the HT paradigm, the actual authentication time of using the HC paradigm may be
shorter. It is because recognition used in the HC paradigm could be faster compared
to mental arithmetic used in the HT paradigm especially for a password with a small
alphabet such as digital PINs. So it could be more appropriate to use these metrics
to classify the schemes according to their paradigms and other design elements, and
then compare the schemes within the same category.
Note that the purpose of the above analysis is not to identify the best scheme.
Since these schemes are designed against different attacks, it may not be fair to
directly compare them, though all these attacks are within the scope of the LRPE
problem. We emphasize that our design metrics are best used to dissect the design
of existing LRPE schemes so that we can better understand the underlying design
decisions and identify potential limitations.
4.7 Challenges behind the LRPE Problem
The reliability of a partial secure channel is the key issue that affects the practicabil-
ity of an LRPE scheme. It may not be easy to address all the common attacks in the
LRPE problem. Figure 4.10 summarizes major potential attacks causing password
leakage during password entry.
This figure divides intermediate components into three layers which deliver mes-
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Accessing internal states (e.g. malware, 
logic key logger)
Intercepting on communication links
(e.g. man-in-the-middle, network sniffer)
Figure 4.10: A layered view of potential attacks against an LRPE scheme
sages between user and server. The top layer is the interaction layer between user
and user interface on a computing device. The messages delivered in this layer are
subject to eavesdropping on all interaction channels, including vision, acoustics, and
motion. For example, physical key logger is a typical attack in the interaction layer,
which targets at the motion channel (i.e. recording the key sequence pressed by the
user). The middle layer is the application layer that translates user interaction into
digital messages and delivers these messages between user interface and communi-
cation layer. The major attacks in this layer are malware and logic key logger that
may intercept plaintext passwords in computer memory. The communication layer
is the bottom layer that delivers messages between application layer and (remote or
local) server via a network connection or a local data bus. The messages delivered
in this layer may be captured by man-in-the-middle attacks. All these attacks need
to be properly addressed in the design of a practical LRPE scheme; otherwise the
scheme will be vulnerable.
Most existing LRPE schemes [44, 61, 23, 25, 42, 13, 12] focus on designing the
protection mechanisms on the interaction layer, while the attacks on the other two
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layers, such as malware and logic key logger, are usually not directly addressed in
their scheme designs. However, it is actually feasible to effectively protect against
these attacks with state-of-the-art technologies nowadays.
We discuss these technologies starting from the communication layer at the bot-
tom. If an LRPE scheme involves a remote server, the attacks of network eaves-
dropping can be effectively prevented with Transport Layer Security (TLS) as long
as it is properly implemented [28]. If an LRPE scheme is designed for unmanaged
devices like public computer kiosks, trusted computing technologies [67] can be
used to protect messages stored in computer memory and deliver them safely via a
local data bus. Trusted computing can also be used to establish a trusted execution
environment [53, 4] in the upper application layer. Such a trusted execution environ-
ment forms a sandbox, which prevents other applications including malware from
accessing the messages stored in the memory space of the protected application that
provides the user interface for password entry.
A recent technique called remote view controller implemented on iOS 6 [11]
further separates the sensitive interface that receives user’s password input from
the application that asks the user to prove his identity. For example, when a user
launches an email composer from a third party app on an iPhone 5, the user interface
of the email composer is actually provided by another system service. This inter-
face (referred to as remote view) cannot be controlled by the third party app once
it launched, as it runs as a separate process. This technique enables privilege sepa-
ration even within an application logic, which protects password related messages
from a logic key logger implanted within the application as long as the integrity of
the sensitive interface is not compromised.
All the above technologies provide feasible solutions to ensure messages can be
safely delivered between user and server. Since their applicability is not dependent
on user interaction, they can be easily adapted in any LRPE design and provide a
foundation to establish the required partial secure channel.
We note that it will take time for the above technologies to become pervasive in
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computing devices. Lack of such trusted execution environment is a major ob-
stacle for adopting LRPE schemes on the global scale. However, it is not necessary
to have all these technologies in place to adopt LRPE schemes in certain settings.
For example, if an LRPE scheme is designed for well managed devices such as
ATM machines, protection of the interaction layer could be sufficient if application
software, operating system, and network have already been secured with dedicated
solutions.
Last but not least, we remark that it is always possible for an adversary to exploit
subtle side channels such as that used in the brainwave analysis via a brain-computer
interface [50]. It may not be feasible or practical to completely prevent these attacks
exploiting inevitable human behavior patterns during password entry.
4.8 Implications and Limitations
In this section, we discuss the implication of solving the LRPE problem, other re-
lated metrics, and the limitations of the design metrics proposed in this study.
4.8.1 Implication of a Practical LRPE Scheme
The success of a practical LRPE scheme requires a leakage-resilient environment
across all three layers between user and server and against various attacks including
malware, key logger, and hidden camera. Thus the conditions required by this envi-
ronment should be satisfied in reasonable real-world settings, instead of remaining
as assumptions. As we analyzed in the last section, it is feasible to establish such an
environment with state-of-the-art technologies [67, 53, 4, 11]. With the widespread
deployment of these technologies, we expect to see increased use of LRPE schemes.
A good LRPE design may not even require a user to carry extra physical de-
vices as seen in the CuePin scheme [42]. All the operations can be completed by
using only the primary device that the user has to carry anyway to access services
after user authentication. An LRPE scheme designed in this way will become much
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more scalable as it can apply to many application scenarios where it is not afford-
able or convenient to use hardware-based OTPs. For example, a user no longer
needs to worry about password leakage caused by the ATM skimming attack [43]
when using a physical ATM. If an LRPE scheme uses only commodity computing
devices and incurs reasonably low usability costs, it may even have the potential to
replace legacy passwords. On the other hand, hardware-based OTPs will still serve
as a second factor in user authentication for high value services; they complement
the protection by further mitigating other threats such as social engineering. By
combining LRPE schemes and hardware-based OTPs, the cost of attacks to user
authentication could be significantly increased.
4.8.2 Other Metrics
There are other metrics which are not directly related to password leakage during
password entry, but they are still important for practical purposes. Secure password
storage is one example. All existing usable LRPE schemes without using any form
of secure channel [35, 48, 71, 72, 10] store users’ passwords in cleartext; otherwise,
the challenges in authentication cannot be generated as specified in their design.
There is no such restriction if a partial secure channel is available.
On the other hand, although our metrics cover all the major design aspects of
LRPE schemes that can be deterministically characterized in the design phase, the
designer may still need to investigate the following nondeterministic aspects. 1)
Choice between text and graphic symbols: although some psychology evidence [22]
shows that it tends to be easier for users to remember graphic symbols, this advan-
tage can be significantly undermined due to the chunking effect [31] when users
can find a logical relation that helps memorizing a text password. 2) Recall and
recognition: they cannot be deterministically characterized due to similar reasons
caused by the chunking effect. 3) Password interference: it is caused by the inherent
limitation of human memory capability explained by the interference theory [68],
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where memorizing a password may affect the user’s memory of another password.
4) Types of cognitive operations: since most operations related to a partial secure
channel are designed to operate an uncommon device, it is difficult to find respective
performance models to precisely characterize the cognitive workload for each type
of cognitive operation [75]. 5) User perception-related metrics: metrics likes user
frustration level, concentration level, and motivational effort are susceptible to many
implementation and environmental factors. Besides the above metrics, traditional
evaluation metrics also include login error rate, time to login, learning curve, etc.
It is necessary to examine all these metrics to ensure the completeness of scheme
evaluation.
4.8.3 Limitations
The design metrics we propose in this work are still in the preliminary stage. The
relations between some design metrics and the actual usability costs remain hy-
potheses, though the rationales behind these metrics are straightforward. Future
work may be required to systematically verify their validity by conducting user
study on real systems. However, the usability is a vague notion, which includes
many interrelated aspects and different users may have completely different percep-
tions on how usable a system is. So it is always possible to miss certain factors that
may significantly influence the actual usability. Furthermore, the results of usability
evaluation may even heavily depend on the selection of subjects. People in differ-
ent cultures have different advantage and disadvantage in using such systems [17].
Even for the same system and the same subject, the results could be significantly
different depending on whether the subject is properly motivated and learns to use
the system by self-learning or well-designed training. Many other factors also have
to be controlled in order to produce a reasonable comparison among existing sys-
tems. Proper assessment of usability is indeed challenging, which probably explains
why there does not exist any prior work on large scale quantitative analysis of user
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authentication systems.
As indicated by Bonneau et al. [15], it is important to provide consistent quali-
tative metrics when it is not feasible to derive consistent quantitative metrics. Our
design metrics follow this philosophy but with a twist. We attempt to go deeper
to dissect the system into individual design elements. This provides a fine-grained
context for designers to better understand underlying design elements and their rela-
tions, which may further facilitate a fair comparison among systems with a similar
internal structure. Although we are not able to provide more quantitative values
for all the design metrics as the relations between these metrics and their impacts
on usability may not be linear, the list of related design elements required by these
metrics can still help the designers to examine the necessity of each design element
and identify the limitations in the early stage.
Our metrics also complement traditional evaluation metrics by expanding the
scope of security and usability evaluation beyond the traditional laboratory user
study. This may remind designers of the important missing factors, such as the im-
pacts of time pressure, distraction, and mental workload. Although they are not
classified as design metrics as they need to be evaluated in a user study, they are
common situations for an LRPE schemes used on daily basis. Thus it could be bet-
ter for the future study to include these metrics so that the usability evaluation would
be more precise. An example result could be “usable even under pressure level 3.0”
instead of simply “usable”, if we are able to answer the question how to define the
standardized pressure condition. We believe this is the right direction to produce
more credible results for the evaluation of security systems involving human inter-
action. We hope our efforts on the design metrics for the LRPE schemes can provide
an insight for the future development of design metrics for other security systems.
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4.9 Discussion
In this work, we made the first attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding
for the leakage-resilient password entry (LRPE) problem, which addresses the chal-
lenges of designing practical LRPE schemes. We proposed a broad set of metrics
to evaluate LRPE schemes from different perspectives, including security-usability
relations, built-in security, and universal accessibility. These metrics were designed
to identify the potential limitations before conducting user studies. They were ap-
plied to existing LRPE schemes, which reveals that their major limitations include
1) requiring an uncommon device feature, 2) inoperable in certain common scenar-
ios, and 3) lack of trusted execution environment. Our analysis further showed that
it is possible to overcome these limitations by improving the design according to
the proposed metrics. We expect these design metrics be used to guide the design
of LRPE schemes in future research.
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Chapter 5
Designing Leakage-Resilient
Password Entry on Touchscreen
Mobile Devices
5.1 Introduction
Guided by the metrics developed in our second work, this chapter proposes a secure
and usable LRPE scheme leveraging on the touchscreen feature of mobile devices.
Mobile devices are becoming essential tools in modern life, which seamlessly con-
nect human beings to the cyberspace. A user can now use a smartphone or tablet
to access not only general informative services but also sensitive services such as
mobile banking and corporate services. In order to prevent unauthorized access to
these services, user authentication is required to verify the identity of a user. Among
existing user authentication mechanisms, passwords are still the most pervasive due
to their significant advantage in usability over other alternatives such as smartcards
and biometrics [49]. However, password-based user authentication has intrinsic
weakness in password leakage, which may lead to financial loss or corporate data
disclosure. This threat could be more serious in scenarios when mobile devices are
involved, as mobile devices are widely used in public places.
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Password leakage during password entry is a classic problem in password-based
authentication. Most prior research [35, 48, 71, 72, 10, 44, 61, 23, 42] on this prob-
lem focuses on desktop computers, where specific restrictions on mobile devices are
usually not addressed. These restrictions mainly include: 1) a mobile device usu-
ally has a smaller screen size than a desktop computer; 2) a mobile device needs to
be operable in non-stationary environments such as on public transit. On the other
hand, mobile devices provide additional features such as touchscreen, which may
not be available in traditional settings. These new features can be utilized to support
advanced security properties that were difficult to achieve before.
In this work, we propose a concise yet effective authentication scheme named
CoverPad, which is designed for password entry on touchscreen mobile devices.
CoverPad improves leakage resilience of password entry while retaining most ben-
efits of legacy passwords. Leakage resilience is achieved by utilizing the gesture
detection feature of touchscreen in forming a cover for user inputs. This cover is
used to safely deliver hidden messages, which break the correlation between the un-
derlying password and the interaction information observable to an adversary. From
the other perspective, our scheme is also designed to retain the benefits provided by
legacy passwords. This requirement is critical, as Bonneau et al. [15] conclude that
any user authentication is unlikely to gain traction if it does not retain comparable
benefits of legacy passwords. Our scheme approaches this requirement by involving
only intuitive cognitive operations and requiring no extra devices in the design.
We implement three variants of CoverPad and evaluate them with an extended
user study. This study includes additional test conditions related to time pressure,
distraction, and mental workload. These test conditions simulate common situa-
tions for a daily-used password entry scheme, which have not been evaluated in
the prior literature. We design new experiments to examine their influence based
on previous work in psychology literature [40, 22, 38]. Experimental results show
the influence of these conditions on user performance and the practicability of our
proposed scheme.
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The contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
• We propose CoverPad to protect password entry on touchscreen mobile de-
vices. It achieves leakage resilience and retains most benefits of legacy pass-
words by involving only intuitive cognitive operations and requiring no extra
devices.
• We implement three variants of CoverPad to address different user prefer-
ences. Our user study shows the practicability of these variants.
• We extend user study methodology to examine the influence of various ad-
ditional test conditions. Among these conditions, time pressure and mental
workload are shown to have significant impacts on user performance. There-
fore, it is recommended to include these conditions in the evaluation of user
authentication schemes in the future.
5.2 Threat Model
Passwords are the most pervasive user authentication that allows a human user to
be authenticated to a (local or remote) computer server. Password leakage is a
threat that a user’s password is directly disclosed or indirectly inferred. It usually
happens during password entry, when a user inputs his password in order to prove
his identity. In the case of legacy passwords, a user directly enters his plaintext
password so that the password may be captured via various eavesdropping attacks
including key logger, hidden camera, and malware. We classify these attacks into
two types, external or internal, according to whether an adversary can access the
internal states of a device for password entry, such as device memory.
An external eavesdropping attack is an attack exploiting a leakage channel out-
side a device. This type of attacks includes vision-based eavesdropping such as hid-
den camera, haptics-based eavesdropping such as physical key logger, and acous-
tics-based eavesdropping such as tone analysis. Compared to traditional scenarios
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involving only desktop computers, an adversary has more opportunities to launch an
external eavesdropping attack against mobile devices, as mobile devices are widely
used in public places. In a crowded area, an adversary may observe password entry
in a close distance without being noticed (see Figure 5.1).
User Interaction during 
Password Entry
Leakage 
channels
Vision: screen display, 
finger movement, etc.
Haptics: touched 
position, etc.
Acoustics: key-press 
sound, etc.
Figure 5.1: Attack scenarios
For vision-based attacks, an adversary may infer the actual password by observ-
ing the movement of fingers even without direct line-of-sight on the screen display.
This capability is significantly enhanced with emerging augmented-reality acces-
sory like Google Glass [33], which is a small wearable glass transferring real-time
video captured by a tiny camera to a server and displaying the analyzed results re-
ceived from the server.
Haptics-based attacks are most likely to happen when users use public mobile
devices. Mobile devices, such as iPad, have been used as public computer kiosks
as observed in museums, restaurants, and hotels [39, 37, 77]. In addition, many
existing kiosks are also equipped with touchscreen similar to mobile devices. This
provides an incentive for an adversary to install a physical “touch” logger. Although
such touch logger has not been observed in the wild, it is technically feasible to
implement as other physical key loggers [64]. Considering that the thickness of
touchscreen in Samsung Galaxy S3 is just 1.1mm [3], it may not be noticeable to
users if an extra physical touch logger is installed on a normal touchscreen.
The effectiveness of acoustics-based attacks depends on whether user actions
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can be distinguished by their tone patterns. For example, different tones are played
when a user dials different numbers on an old-style phone. Due to environmental
noises, acoustics-based attacks are usually not as effective as vision-based attacks
and haptics-based attacks.
The other type of attacks that cause password leakage is the internal eaves-
dropping attack. Such attacks exploit a leakage channel inside a device, where
an adversary is allowed to access the internal states such as reading device memory.
This type of attacks include logic key logger, malware, and network eavesdropping,
which are common to all password-based user authentication schemes. Like most
prior research [44, 61, 23, 25, 42, 13, 12], our scheme design does not address these
attacks for the following reasons: 1) Existing solutions [53, 4, 11, 67] such as ap-
plication sandbox are available to effectively defend against these attacks, though it
takes time for them to replace legacy vulnerable systems; 2) these solutions are in-
dependent on user interaction during password entry so that they can be adapted to
any user authentication schemes. Compared to external eavesdropping attacks, the
threat from internal eavesdropping attacks can be effectively mitigated if a user uses
a computer system that is properly updated and configured [28], while it is not easy
to defend against external eavesdropping attacks as they are caused by inevitable ex-
posure of human interaction during password entry. These external eavesdropping
attacks impose realistic threats leading to password leakage. We will thus focus on
external eavesdropping attacks in our scheme design.
Besides the above attacks which happen during password entry, password leak-
age may also be caused by other types of attacks including social engineering and
phishing [49]. Although their mitigation technologies such as secure URL checker
and spam filter have been widely deployed in modern computer systems, some of
these attacks may not be completely preventable by technical solutions alone. An-
other example is the database reading attack, where the back-end databases are in-
truded so that all user passwords are compromised. Since these attacks are orthog-
onal to the password entry problem, they are out of the scope of this work.
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5.3 CoverPad Design
In this section, we present the design of CoverPad. First, we describe our design
objectives from both security and usability perspectives. Then, we introduce the
conceptual design of CoverPad. Lastly, we present three variants in implementing
CoverPad.
5.3.1 Design Objectives
CoverPad is designed to improve leakage resilience of password entry while re-
taining most benefits of legacy passwords. We describe our design objectives as
follows.
First, in terms of security, a scheme should minimize password leakage during
password entry under realistic settings. To achieve this objective, a user should 1)
input obfuscated response derived from his password, and/or 2) input his password
in a secure channel. A recent study [75] shows strong evidence on the infeasibility
of using obfuscated response solely based on human cognitive capabilities. There-
fore, it is necessary to rely on certain secure channel to achieve this security objec-
tive. However, a standard secure channel may be difficult to establish in practice,
which requires to protect all messages delivered between user and server. Therefore,
we choose a hybrid solution in our scheme design. With the assistance of simple
obfuscation, the requirement on a secure channel can be significantly reduced, as
only a few critical messages need to be protected. Such channel is referred to as
partial secure channel.
In the presence of a partial secure channel, it is possible to achieve the optimal
security objective – no password leakage. As long as the partial secure channel
is not compromised, CoverPad provides the same leakage resilience as one-time
pad [54], where the most efficient attacks for an adversary to learn the password are
online dictionary attacks. We will show how this security objective is achieved in
our scheme in the following sections.
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Second, in terms of usability, a scheme should preserve the benefits of legacy
passwords in order to gain traction [15]. The major benefits of legacy passwords
include no extra devices required, and only intuitive cognitive operations performed.
We further consider additional restrictions on mobile devices including that 1) a
mobile device usually has a smaller screen size compared to a desktop computer;
2) a mobile device needs to be operable in a non-stationary environment such as
on public transit. So we minimize the number of visual elements that are displayed
simultaneously on the screen, and also simplify the involved operations to make
them suitable in a non-stationary environment.
5.3.2 Conceptual Design
The conceptual design of CoverPad is shown in Figure 5.2, where a hidden trans-
formation Ti(·) is a random mapping Ω → Ω, where Ω is the set of all individual
elements contained in the password alphabet.
Setup:
A server and a user agree on a k-length password pwd = (a1, a2, . . . , ak),
where a password element ai = pwd[i] belongs to an alphabet with size w.
It is allowed that ai = aj , for i 6= j.
Password Entry:
For each i from [1, k]:
Step 1: The touchscreen shows a keypad with all the elements in the
alphabet.
Step 2: The user is asked to perform a hand-shielding gesture to read the
hidden transformation Ti(·) protected by the hand-shielding gesture. Ti(·)
will immediately disappear if the gesture is no longer detected.
Step 3: The user clicks on response element ei, where ei = Ti(ai) =
(ai + ri mod w), where ri is a random number drawn from a uniform
distribution. A new random number ri is generated for each round i. The
hand-shielding gesture is not required for this step.
Figure 5.2: Conceptual design of CoverPad
An example of using CoverPad is given as follows. Suppose a user has a k-
length password. At the beginning of password entry, the user performs the hand-
shielding gesture to view the current hidden transformation T1 for the first character
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a1 in his password. Then, he applies T1 to a1 and enters the transformed response e1.
This procedure repeats for each password element ai. During the whole password
entry, Ti disappears immediately once the gesture is not being detected. A user can
always view Ti by performing the gesture again before inputting ei.
Figure 5.3: The hand-shielding gesture and its effectiveness
Figure 5.3 shows how to correctly perform a hand-shielding gesture. This ges-
ture restricts the vision channel to a small visual cone. This visual cone is not
accessible to an adversary unless the adversary’s eyes are close enough to the user’s
head, which makes the adversary easily exposed. A hidden camera near the line
of sight may help capture the hidden transformation. However, it needs to be ad-
justed according to the user’s height and current position, which may lead to user’s
awareness. On the other hand, the observable responses for the same password el-
ement are uniformly randomized. Thus, CoverPad is also immune to haptics-based
eavesdropping. Further analysis is provided in the next section.
Therefore, it is difficult to compromise the partial secure channel formed by the
hand-shielding gesture from external eavesdropping attacks in practice, though the
use of this gesture is simple. If the protective gesture is not being detected by the
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touchscreen, the hidden transformation will not be displayed such that the hidden
transformation is always protected under the required gesture. Note that a hidden
transformation alone does not leak any information about the password. As long as
the hidden transformation is not revealed together with the corresponding response,
observed interaction provides no valuable information for an adversary to infer the
actual password. A proof about this security property will be given in Section 5.4.
5.3.3 Implementation Variants
We provide three variants of CoverPad that implement different features tailored
for users with various skill sets, which are described and illustrated as follows (see
Figure 5.4).
(a) NumPad-Add (b) NumPad-Shift
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(c) LetterPad-Shift
Figure 5.4: Demonstration of three implementation variants
NumPad-Add
In NumPad-Add, the alphabet of password consists of digits 0 to 9 only. The hidden
transformation is performed by adding a random digit to the current password ele-
ment and then mod 10 if the sum is larger than 9, where the value of the random
digit ranges from 0 to 9. For example, the correct response for the first round is
6 = (9 + 7) mod 10 given password 934567 and the hidden message ‘plus 7’.
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NumPad-Shift
In NumPad-Shift, the alphabet of password consists of digits 0 to 9 only. The hid-
den transformation is performed by shifting the location of the current password
element by X-offset and Y -offset, where the offset values are randomly taken
from {−1, 0, 1} for X-offset, and {−1, 0, 1, 2} for Y -offset. For a 3 × 4 keypad
design shown in Figure 5.4(b), the transformed response for ai is calculated as
pad[x(ai) + ∆x mod 3][y(ai) + ∆y mod 4], where ∆x is the X-offset, ∆y is
the Y -offset, and x(ai) is the X-index of ai, and y(ai) is the Y -index of ai. For
example, the correct response for the first round is 5 if the password is 934567 and
the hidden message is ‘move left by 1 step and move up by 1 step’.
Note that two extra keys ∗ and # are added to the keypad; otherwise, the dis-
tribution of hidden transformations is not uniform on the keypad layout. The proof
for the necessity of these two keys is given as follows. Assuming ∗ and # keys
are removed, the keypad now contains only 10 keys for digits 0 to 9. To provide
a full transformation from a secret key to a random key, the minimum value set
is {−1, 0, 1} for X-offsets and {−1, 0, 1, 2} for Y -offsets. There are twelve com-
binations between X-offsets and Y -offsets, but only ten keys on the keypad. If
the offset values are drawn from a uniform distribution, certain response keys for
a given password element would have a higher frequency compared to others (it is
similar as placing twelve balls in ten buckets in a deterministic way). The exact
distribution of response keys is decided by the underlying password element, thus
it discloses valuable information about the password. From the other perspective, if
response keys are drawn from a uniform distribution, the offset values will not be
uniformly distributed due to similar reason. Therefore, it is necessary to add these
two extra keys to the NumPad-Shift keypad.
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LetterPad-Shift
In LetterPad-Shift, the alphabet of password consists of letters a to z and digits 0 to
9 (36 elements in total). The hidden transformation is the same as NumPad-Shift.
The offset values are randomly taken from {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3} for bothX-offset and
Y -offset for a 6 × 6 keypad design. The transformed response for ai is calculated
as pad[x(ai) + ∆x mod 6][y(ai) + ∆y mod 6] in a similar way as for NumPad-
Shift. A background grid is added to ease the calculation of shifting, as shown in
Figure 5.4(c).
5.4 Security Analysis
5.4.1 External Eavesdropping Attacks
Common external eavesdropping attacks leading to password leakage may exploit
vision, haptics, or acoustics channel as analyzed in Section 5.2. For CoverPad, an
adversary using these attacks can observe at most a complete response key sequence
pressed by a user, while the hidden transformation is protected by our design. From
this key sequence, the adversary knows the i-th pressed key is decided by the i-th
element in the password. However, the adversary cannot further infer what the i-th
password element is, as proved as follows.
Proof: Given a pressed key ei, and two password elements ax and ay in a w-sized
password alphabet, let Pr(ei|ax) and Pr(ei|ay) be the probabilities for ei being
pressed when the underlying password element are ax and ay, respectively. We have
Pr(ei|ax) = Pr(ei = ax + ri mod w) = Pr(ri = ei− ax mod w) = Pr(ri = C
mod w) = 1/w = Pr(ei|ay) for any i, x, and y, where C is a constant integer
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. Therefore, a sequence of pressed keys
observed by an adversary is equivalent to a random sequence, which is similar to a
ciphertext generated by a one-time pad.
In a partial secure channel where the hidden transformation is protected by the
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hand-shielding gesture, our scheme achieves no password leakage. As long as the
hidden transformation is not disclosed together with the corresponding response,
an adversary cannot infer any information about the underlying password (except
password length) even after an infinite number of observations.
5.4.2 Side-channel Attacks
In reality, it is possible for an adversary to exploit subtle side-channels to collect
password information during password entry. These attacks are not usually consid-
ered in common threat models [35, 48, 71, 72, 10, 44, 61, 23, 25, 42, 13, 12]. A
typical side-channel attack is timing analysis [63], which analyzes the patterns in
the response time of entering individual password elements. The preliminary re-
sults of our scheme against timing analysis are given in Figure 5.5. For the timing
deviation shown in Figure 5.5(a) and 5.5(b), each bar with x-value i represents the
average response time for entering the transformed responses for a specific pass-
word element i. For the timing distribution shown in Figure 5.5(c), each line in the
figure represents the distribution of the response time for entering the transformed
responses for a specific password element. These results show the range and the
distribution of the response time for entering different password elements are al-
most overlapped. This indicates that timing analysis is not a major concern for our
scheme, though it is difficult to completely prevent such attacks due to inevitable
human behavior patterns during password entry. Detailed analysis on side channel
attacks is out of the scope of this work.
5.5 Usability Evaluation
5.5.1 Methodology
The participants in our user study are recruited from undergraduate students in our
university. There are 61 participants in total, 30 male and 31 female, with age range
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Figure 5.5: Timing deviations and distributions for entering each password element.
The results of NumPad-Shift are similar to the results of NumPad-Add shown in
these figures.
between 20 and 25. These participants come from five different departments, in
which 42 of them have a social science or business related background, and the
remaining have a computer science or information technology related background.
Each participant is paid with 10 dollars as compensation for their time. We establish
a ranking system from which a participant can see a performance score representing
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how well the participant performs compared to other participants. This ranking
system provides a moderate level of motivation for the participants to do their best
in tests. A numerical identifier is assigned to each participant in order to protect
user privacy.
The user study is conducted in a quiet room. The experiments use a within-
objects design. Each participant is asked to use all three variants as three test groups.
These variants are implemented on Apple iPad, which are referred to as schemes in
this section. The order of the schemes is randomized to avoid the learning effect
that affects the performance for a specific scheme. For each test group, a user is
required to memorize a randomly generated password in the beginning. The pass-
word strength is set to be equivalent to 6-digit PIN, where the password length is
4 for LetterPad-Shift, and 6 for both NumPad-Shift and NumPad-Add. The same
password will be used for the same test group and a “show my password” button is
provided in case a participant forgot the password. The participants learn how to use
a scheme by an interactive step-by-step tutorial. The participants are required to go
through the whole tutorial for the first scheme appearing in the tests, and they may
skip the tutorial for the second and third schemes after learning the basic scheme
design. In the end of each tutorial, there is a short pretest for the participant to ex-
ercise. If a participant fails to pass the pretest, the researchers will provide help to
ensure that the participant understands how to use the scheme before the tests start.
In each test group, there are six tests simulating additional test conditions that
evaluate the influence of time pressure, distraction, and mental workload. The de-
tails of these test conditions are described in the next subsection. The order of these
tests is also randomized in order to avoid the learning effect.
All three test groups consist of 18 tests in total. To avoid the participants from
feeling exhausted and bored, each test is designed to be short and can be finished
within one or two minutes. The participants are given a short break after each test
group. At the end of the user study, the participants are given a questionnaire using
5-point Likert scale to collect their perception on the schemes. The whole user study
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takes 35 ∼ 50 minutes to complete.
5.5.2 Simulating Various Test Conditions
In order to simulate various test conditions related to time pressure, distraction, and
mental workload, we introduce two extra experimental tools, timer and secondary
task. A timer is used to create time pressure by showing a participant how much time
is left for the current test condition. It is implemented as a progress bar whose length
increases every second with a countdown text field showing how many seconds are
left. Secondary tasks are used to simulate unexpected distraction and persistent
mental workload. We use CRT (choice reaction time) tasks as secondary tasks,
which is a standard technology in experimental psychology [40, 22, 38]. CRT tasks
usually work as secondary tasks that occupy the central executive1 in human brain
when evaluating the performance of a primary task in the presence of a secondary
task. CRT tasks require participants to give distinct responses for each possible
stimulus. In our implementation, the participants are asked to press the correct
button among N buttons, where the correct button should have the same color as
the stimulus. For example, if the stimulus shows a red button, a participant should
press the red button among N buttons with different colors. We use N = 2 for tests
in the distraction condition as the major focus is to unexpectedly disrupt password
entry with a CRT task. We use N = 8 for tests in the mental workload condition
so as to create a considerable mental workload, which is the same as in the classic
Jensen Box setting [40].
Based on the above experimental tools, we simulate six test conditions for each
test group by combining the two modes and three statuses. Two modes related to a
timer are described as follows:
• Relaxed mode: A participant is asked to minimize the error rate in a fixed
number of login attempts where time is not considered in performance score
1The central executive is a control system that mediates attention and regulation of processes
occurring in working memory [9].
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calculation. The number of login attempts is 5 for no-extra-task status and 3
for distraction and mental workload statuses.
• Timed mode: A participant is asked to perform as many successful logins
as possible within 1 minute, where both time and accuracy are considered
in performance score calculation. The countdown of a timer creates time
pressure.
Three statuses related to secondary tasks are described as follows:
• No-extra-task status: A participant is asked to perform the login task only.
• Distraction status: A simple CRT task may appear with 1/3 probability each
time when a participant presses a response key. This task is used to create
unexpected distractions during password entry.
• Mental workload status: A relatively complex CRT task appears every time
when a participant presses a response key. This task is used to create contin-
uing mental workload during password entry.
Among six conditions, we referred to the combination of relaxed mode and no-
extra-task status as the normal condition, which is the common condition usually
tested in prior work [35, 48, 71, 72, 10, 44, 61, 23, 25, 42, 13, 12]. The short names
for the other five conditions are given in Table 5.1.
Short name Full specification
normal relaxed mode + no-extra-task status
timed timed mode + no-extra-task status
distraction relaxed mode + distraction status
distraction+timed timed mode + distraction status
mental workload relaxed mode + mental workload status
mental workload+timed timed mode + mental workload status
Table 5.1: Short names for test conditions
The hypotheses related to these test conditions are described as follows.
(H1) Compared to the normal condition, login time will be significantly shorter
when time pressure is present.
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(H2) Compared to the normal condition, login accuracy will be significantly lower
when time pressure is present.
(H3) Compared to the normal condition, login time will be significantly longer
when unexpected distraction is present.
(H4) Compared to the normal condition, login accuracy will be significantly lower
when unexpected distraction is present.
(H5) Compared to the normal condition, login time will be significantly longer
when persistent mental workload is present.
(H6) Compared to the normal condition, login accuracy will be significantly lower
when persistent mental workload is present.
(H7) Compared to a condition in relaxed mode with secondary tasks, login time
will be significantly shorter for its counterpart in timed mode.
(H8) Compared to a condition in relaxed mode with secondary tasks, login accu-
racy will be significantly lower for its counterpart in timed mode.
5.5.3 Learning Curve
Although our scheme design involves intuitive operations only, it requires a differ-
ent process for password entry compared to legacy passwords. While we expect
the participants can learn this process with the tutorial and pretests, we observed
that some participants were impatient to read all instructions and keep pressing the
next button. These participants proceeded to the evaluation stage before they fully
understand our scheme design.
Figure 5.6 compares user performance under the normal condition for different
positions where a scheme appears in the study. These results show the user perfor-
mance in terms of login time and login success rates is significantly worse when the
tested scheme is the first scheme which a participant encountered in the user study.
But the differences on user performance are not significant if a scheme is encoun-
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Figure 5.6: Learning curve of CoverPad
tered as the second or third test group, as all our schemes are similar due to the fact
that they are based on the same conceptual design. As shown in the learning curve
in Figure 5.6, most participants get familiar with our scheme design after the first
test group. Therefore, we consider the first test group as part of the learning process,
and use the performance data collected from the second and third test groups only
in the following analysis.
5.5.4 Experimental Results
We measure user performance with the following metrics: average login time, login
success rates, round success rates, and average edit distances. A round success
rate is the average success rate for a user to correctly input one password element
by applying a hidden transformation. An edit distance is the minimum number of
insertions, deletions, substitutions, and adjacent transpositions required to transform
an input string into the correct password string so that an average edit distance is
the average value of edit distances calculated from all login attempts of a user under
a test condition. Among these metrics, login success rates, round success rates, and
average edit distances are used to evaluate login accuracy.
We use the following statistical tools to test the significance of our experimental
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results, where a significance level of α = .05 is used. For each comparison, we
run an omnibus test across all test conditions for each scheme. Since all our per-
formance data are quantitative, we use Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test for omnibus tests,
which is an analogue of ANOVA but does not require normality. If the omnibus
test indicates significance, we further use Mann-Whitney (MW) U test to perform
pair-wise comparisons so as to identify specific pairs with significant differences.
The detailed results of our statistical tests are given in Section 5.5.5.
Performance under Normal Condition
In the normal condition, a participant is only asked to perform login tasks without
any time pressure or secondary tasks. It corresponds to the combination of relaxed
mode and no-extra-task status, which is used as a baseline in our tests.
Figure 5.7(a) shows the average time for a successful login attempt in the normal
condition. For all the three schemes, most participants are able to finish the login
within 13 seconds. Figure 5.7(b) and 5.7(c) show the corresponding login accuracy.
Since our experiment limits the number of login attempts to 5 in order to prevent the
participants from feeling exhausted or bored, even a single mistake would take the
login success rate down to 80%. Our results indicate that most participants make at
most one mistake when they use our schemes for the first time after a short training.
This is shown by 97.5% average round success rate and 0.13 average edit distance in
the worst case. Particularly, for the distribution of average edit distance of NumPad-
Shift, 27 participants among 40 samples (after removing the experimental data when
NumPad-Shift appears as the first test group) has an average edit distance of zero
(i.e. no mistakes during all tests under the test condition), which are shown as a
cluster of outliers at the bottom of the box chart. The login accuracy is expected to
increase after the participants get more familiar with the schemes.
100
N u m P a d - A d d N u m P a d - S h i f t L e t t e r P a d - S h i f t
5
7
9
1 1
1 3
1 5
1 7
1 9
2 1
(a) Login time distribution (sec)
L o g i n  s u c c e s s  r a t e R o u n d  s u c c e s s  r a t e
0 . 8 6
0 . 8 8
0 . 9 0
0 . 9 2
0 . 9 4
0 . 9 6
0 . 9 8
1 . 0 0  N u m P a d - A d d  
 N u m P a d - S h i f t  
 L e t t e r P a d - S h i f t  
(b) Average success rate
N u m P a d - A d d N u m P a d - S h i f t L e t t e r P a d - S h i f t
0 . 0
0 . 5
1 . 0
1 . 5
(c) Edit distance distribution
Figure 5.7: Average login time, success rate, and edit distance under the normal
condition
Influence of Time Pressure
Figure 5.8 shows the impact of time pressure without any secondary tasks. The re-
sults show that the participants behave much hastily in the presence of time pressure.
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The average time for a successful login attempt becomes shorter and the login accu-
racy is decreased. The statistical tests show the difference in login time is significant
(p =.017 for NumPad-Add and p <.001 for LetterPad-Shift) but the difference in
login accuracy is not. Therefore, H1 is supported while H2 is not.
The insignificant results in login accuracy are due to the ceiling effect [1], which
implies the tests are not sufficiently difficult to distinguish the influence of different
test conditions. This effect could be caused by our scheme design, which is not dif-
ficult for the participants to use so that the majority of the participants did not make
any mistakes during all the tests. This effect will be later discussed in Section 5.5.5.
However, even without statistical significance, we still observe the average results of
login accuracy become worse for all three tested schemes. Considering the simple
design of our schemes, this indicates that time pressure may have a larger influence
on the login accuracy of a more complex scheme.
Influence of Distraction
Figure 5.9 shows the impact of distraction without time pressure. Many partici-
pants made a mistake when they saw a distraction task for the first time (however,
NumPad-Shift is an exception). For NumPad-Add and LetterPad-Shift shown in
Figure 5.9(b), the round success rate returns to a comparable level as the normal
condition, after the first time the distraction task appears. This indicates that the
distraction task is no longer a surprise for the participants. However, even after
the participants get familiar with the distraction tasks, compared to the normal con-
dition, the success rate is still lower, the average edit distance is larger, and the
average login time is longer. But the statistical tests show these differences are not
significant. Therefore, H3 and H4 are not supported in our experiments.
Influence of Mental Workload
Figure 5.10 shows the impact of mental workload without time pressure. The av-
erage login time becomes significantly longer with mental workload (p =.003 for
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Figure 5.8: Impact of time pressure
NumPad-Add) due to context switch in users’ mind between password inputs and
secondary CRT tasks. An extra startup time is required to release the central exec-
utive after each CRT task. Our experiment simulates the case when users cannot
get rid of other thoughts during password entry. The actual effect of mental work-
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Figure 5.9: Impact of distraction
load depends on the status of users’ mind. The impact may be elevated when the
actual mental workload is higher than our CRT tasks. On the other hand, the lo-
gin accuracy is lower compared to the normal condition but the difference is not
significant due to the same ceiling effect mentioned in Section 5.5.4. Therefore,
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H5 is supported and H6 is not. These results show that persistent mental workload
significantly slows the process of password entry for our schemes.
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Figure 5.10: Impact of mental workload
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Performance under Combined Conditions
We also examine the overall impact when distraction or mental workload appears to-
gether with time pressure. As expected, compared to their counterparts without time
pressure, the average login time becomes shorter (from 10.3 seconds to 11.7 seconds
on average), the login success rate becomes even lower (from 81.3% to 87.5%), and
the average edit distance becomes larger (from 0.151 to 0.243). The statistical tests
show the difference in login time is significant (p =.009 for NumPad-Add, p =.019
for NumPad-Shift, and p <.001 for LetterPad-Shift) and the difference in login ac-
curacy is still not significant due to the ceiling effect explained in Section 5.5.4.
Therefore, H7 is supported but H8 is not. These results show time pressure is still
an effective stimulus to speed password entry even in the presence of secondary
tasks.
Effectiveness of Secondary Tasks
Figure 5.11 shows the distribution of the accuracy rate which represents the per-
centage of secondary tasks being correctly performed by a participant under certain
test condition. The overall average accuracy rate is 98.3% across all these test con-
ditions. It implies that the participants did pay attention to these tasks, as they were
told that the performance of these tasks also contributes to their scores in the rank-
ing system. Therefore, these CRT tasks work as intended in disturbing participants’
mind during password entry.
Memory Interference by Mental Calculation
Figure 5.12 shows how frequently a participant presses the “show my password”
button during all tests in a test group. Note that the participants are not allowed
to write down their assigned passwords, but they can always click that button in
case they forgot their passwords. The overall average value for the total number
of times to press the “show my password” button is only 0.31 across all three test
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Figure 5.11: Accuracy rate of performing secondary tasks
groups. As shown in Figure 5.12, most users did not use this button during the tests.
This implies that the mental calculation involved in the hidden transformation of
our schemes does not pose a significant interference on participants’ capability of
recalling their passwords.
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Figure 5.12: Total number of times for each participant to press the “show my pass-
word” button
User Perception
Figure 5.13 shows the perception of participants collected from questionnaires. The
results indicate that the participants generally feel that our schemes are secure and
easy to use. While NumPad-Add is the most popular, the other two schemes also
have their favorite users.
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Figure 5.13: Perception of participants
5.5.5 Statistical Test Results
Table 5.2 shows the results of statistical tests on login time. All pairwise tests are
Mann-Whitney U, where the statistically significant results are marked with F.
These results indicate that the same test condition may have different impact on the
login time of different schemes.
The results of statistical tests on login accuracy are not shown as none of them
indicate significance. This is caused by the ceiling effect, which can be observed
from the data shown in Table 5.3. Even in the worst case, 50.0% participants did not
make any mistakes during all tests in the test condition, which implies our tests are
not sufficiently difficult to distinguish these test conditions regarding their influence
on the login accuracy of our schemes. This could be caused by the simple design
of our schemes such that they are easy to use even in the presence of time pressure,
distraction, and mental workload. However, it does not necessarily imply that these
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Average login time of NumPad-Add - omnibus KW χ25=32.423, p <.001
normal (10.4) timed (9.2) U=551, p =.017F
distraction (11.2) U=679, p =.184
distraction+timed (10.3) U=878, p =.989
mental workload (11.8) U=515, p =.003F
mental workload+timed (10.7) U=696, p =.319
distraction (11.2) distraction+timed (10.3) U=718, p =.107
mental workload (11.8) mental workload+timed (10.7) U=558, p =.009F
Average login time of NumPad-Shift - omnibus KW χ25=11.965, p =.034
normal (11.7) timed (11.2) U=666, p =.199
distraction (13.5) U=645, p =.137
distraction+timed (11.7) U=727, p =.485
mental workload (13.3) U=655, p =.164
mental workload+timed (11.4) U=644, p =.135
distraction (13.5) distraction+timed (11.7) U=565, p =.024F
mental workload (13.3) mental workload+timed (11.4) U=555, p =.019F
Average login time of LetterPad-Shift - omnibus KW χ25=49.252, p <.001
normal (13.2) timed (10.1) U=294, p <.001F
distraction (13.6) U=774, p =.667
distraction+timed (11.0) U=413, p <.001F
mental workload (13.4) U=653, p =.116
mental workload+timed (11.5) U=472, p =.002F
distraction (13.6) distraction+timed (11.0) U=422, p <.001F
mental workload (13.4) mental workload+timed (11.5) U=631, p =.075
Table 5.2: The results of statistical tests on login time (sec)
factors will not significantly influence the login accuracy of other user authentica-
tion schemes. Since the average results of login accuracy are observed to be worse
due to the presence of these factors in our tests, we expect they would have a more
significant influence on other schemes with higher complexity.
NumPad-Add NumPad-Shift LetterPad-Shift
normal 82.9% 67.5% 75.6%
timed 78.0% 62.5% 53.7%
distraction 80.5% 70.0% 63.4%
distraction+timed 70.7% 55.0% 58.5%
mental workload 75.6% 57.5% 65.9%
mental workload+timed 65.9% 50.0% 51.2%
Table 5.3: Evidence for the ceiling effect in statistical tests on login accuracy. Each
cell in this table shows the percentages of the participants who did not make any
mistakes in a test condition.
5.5.6 Comparison with Legacy Passwords
Table 5.4 compares CoverPad with legacy passwords based on the design metrics
developed in Chapter 4.
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CoverPad Schemes Legacy Passwords
Built-in security Yes No
Human
capability
Shield, recall, simple
arithmetic or geometric
operation, click
Recall, click
Device
availability
Keypad on a touchscreen Any keypad
Environmental
adaptation
Single hand with a support Single hand with a support
Space-memory
ratio
nk/k nk/k
Screen utility rate 1.0 1.0
No-leakage Yes No
Cognitive
operation list
1 recall + 1 hint reading +
1 transforming (3m)
1 recall (1m)
Channel
effectiveness
Vision input + click-based
output
Vision input + click-based
output
Password storage Ciphertext Ciphertext
Table 5.4: Comparison between CoverPad and legacy passwords using LRPE de-
sign metrics
Table 5.5 further gives a comparison based on the usability-deployability-
security metrics proposed in [15], where a metric is not shown if neither our schemes
nor legacy passwords offer corresponding benefit. We have the following observa-
tions in comparison. 1) Our schemes are rated as not mature since they are just
proposed and have not been widely deployed. 2) Our schemes are not server-
compatible, as most current servers support only static and replayable passwords,
which could be changed in the near future. 3) Our schemes are quasi-resilient-to-
internal-observation in a sense that any key logger or malware which fails to capture
the hidden transformation causes no password leakage. Overall, these tables show
that our schemes significantly improve the security strength while retaining most
benefits of legacy passwords.
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CoverPad
Schemes
• • ◦ ◦ • • • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • •
Legacy
Passwords
• • • ◦ • • • • • • • ◦ • • • •
Table 5.5: Comparison between CoverPad and legacy passwords using usability-
deployability-security metrics [15]. • = offer the benefit, ◦ = almost offer the benefit,
no circle = does not offer the benefit
5.6 Other Practical Issues and Limitations
5.6.1 Eavesdropping Attacks
Eavesdropping attacks such as vision-based eavesdropping may require the physical
presence of an adversary, which limits the scale of their threat. However, the scale
of attacks is not the only factor that determines the impact of attacks, which is
also decided by the severity of potential losses. If a victim is an important person
in a company, password leakage may lead to disclosing sensitive corporate data,
which would provide sufficient incentives to an adversary. While internal attacks
such as malware and logic key logger could be prevented by properly updating and
configuring the computing system [53, 4, 11, 67] used by the victim, it is difficult
to effectively mitigate the threat of external eavesdropping attacks due to inevitable
exposure of human-computer interaction during the entry of legacy passwords. This
threat becomes more serious in scenarios when a mobile device is used in public
places.
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Nevertheless, the threat of external eavesdropping attacks can be effectively mit-
igated with CoverPad. Besides enhanced security features, our scheme retains most
benefits of legacy passwords and can be implemented on commodity devices. Our
scheme is not only applicable to mobile devices but also other devices equipped
with touchscreen. For example, many ATM machines have been deployed with
touchscreen. Our scheme can be deployed on these machines to mitigate the threat
of the ATM skimming attack [43].
5.6.2 Device Screen Size
Although we implement our scheme on Apple iPad, it could be easily adapted to
other screen sizes, as illustrated in Figure 5.14. For a mobile phone with a small
touchscreen like Apple iPhone, a user can use a hand A to perform the hand-
shielding gesture, and use the other hand B to hold the phone. The thumb on hand
B can be used to press the response keys. For a mobile phone with a larger touch-
screen like Samsumg Galaxy Note II, a user may not be able to click all the keys
with the thumb of hand B that holds the device. To deal with this situation, he
only needs to use one hand A to perform the hand-shielding gesture and key press-
ing sequentially. Once the user raises his hand before pressing a key, the hidden
transformation immediately disappears because the gesture is no longer detected by
the touchscreen. Meantime, the user does not need to worry about whether the ac-
tual keys pressed or the finger movements during key pressing may be observed by
an adversary, as the sequence of pressed keys alone does not leak any information
about the underlying password as analyzed in Section 5.4.
5.6.3 Limitations
Ecological validity is a challenging issue in any user study. Like most prior re-
search [35, 48, 44, 25, 42], our experiments engage only university students. These
participants are younger and more educated compared to the general population.
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Gesture 
detection area
Figure 5.14: Conceptual demonstration on a small screen device
Therefore, usability evaluation may vary with other populations. Our experiments
are also restricted by the sample size, which may affect the results of statistical tests.
Typical examples are the insignificant results on the login accuracy of our schemes.
Moreover, our user study does not include experiments on memory effects (e.g. for-
getting). Since our scheme uses the same alphabet and password composition as
legacy passwords, the users may use the same coping strategies to help themselves
to memorize the passwords in our scheme. The impact of memory effects on the
user performance would be similar to legacy passwords as shown in the prior liter-
ature [24, 62].
5.7 Discussion
In this work, we proposed a leakage-resilient password entry scheme leveraging
on the touchscreen feature of mobile devices. It achieves leakage resilience while
preserving most benefits of legacy passwords. Three variants of this scheme were
implemented. The practicability of our scheme was evaluated in an extended user
study that incorporates new experiments to examine the influence of additional test
conditions related to time pressure, distraction, and mental workload. These condi-
tions were tested for the first time in the evaluation of user authentication schemes.
Among these conditions, time pressure and mental workload were shown to have
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significant impacts on user performance. Therefore, we suggest including these
conditions in the evaluation of user authentication schemes in the future research.
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Chapter 6
Dissertation Conclusion and Future
Work
6.1 Summary of Contribution
This dissertation makes contributions on understanding and solving the problem of
designing secure and usable leakage-resilient password entry (LRPE) schemes.
Our first work provided a comprehensive analysis for the inherent limitations in
LRPE design. We analyzed the impacts of two types of generic attacks, brute force
and statistical attacks, on the existing schemes designed for unaided humans when
a trusted device is unavailable. We introduced five principles that are necessary to
achieve leakage resilience. Usability costs for these principles were analyzed. Our
findings indicate that either high memory demand or high cognitive workload is un-
avoidable in the design of secure LRPE schemes without utilizing trusted devices.
To further understand the tradeoff between security and usability, we established
the first quantitative analysis framework on usability costs. Our result shows that
there is a strong tradeoff between security and usability, indicating that an unaided
human may not be competent enough to use a secure LRPE scheme in practical
settings. This work has been published in the Proceedings of the 19th Annual Net-
work and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2012) [75], and won the
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distinguished paper award.
In the second work, we made the first attempt to provide a comprehensive un-
derstanding for the challenges of designing practical LRPE schemes even in the
presence of trusted devices. We proposed a broad set of design metrics to evaluate
LRPE schemes from different perspectives, including security-usability relations,
built-in security, and universal accessibility. These metrics were designed to iden-
tify the potential limitations before conducting user studies. They were applied to
existing LRPE schemes to reveals their limitations. Our analysis further showed
that it is possible to overcome these limitations by improving the design according
to the proposed metrics. This work has been submitted to a security journal at the
time when this dissertation was submitted.
Finally, we proposed a leakage-resilient password entry scheme leveraging on
the touchscreen feature of mobile devices. It achieves leakage resilience while pre-
serving most benefits of legacy passwords. Three variants of this scheme were
implemented. The practicability of our scheme was evaluated in an extended user
study that incorporates new experiments to examine the influence of additional test
conditions. These conditions were tested for the first time in the evaluation of user
authentication schemes. Among these conditions, time pressure and mental work-
load were shown to have significant impacts on user performance. Therefore, we
suggest including these conditions in the evaluation of user authentication schemes
in the future research. This work has been published in the Proceedings of the 8th
ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (Asia-
CCS 2013) [76].
6.2 Future Direction
Designing a more secure but still usable user authentication scheme is the holy
grail of the research on user authentication. After many failures [44, 61, 23, 25,
42, 13, 12] in this quest of replacing legacy passwords, more and more tradeoffs in
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the design of such schemes are identified. The discovery of these tradeoffs reveals
the crucial truth that it may not be possible to design a perfect user authentication
scheme that has all desired security properties without sacrificing usability [75, 20].
The underlying reason is that human beings are lack of necessary capabilities to per-
form calculation and memory operations required by a theoretically secure scheme.
Since the imperfection seems inevitable, how to find a better balance between se-
curity and usability in a scheme design will remain a challenging research problem
until the fundamental limitation caused by the incompetence of human beings is
resolved.
Theoretically, there are two possible approaches to overcome this limitation.
The first approach is to enhance nature human capabilities to a level that is sufficient
to perform the required operations. The recent development of genetic engineering
sheds light on this approach, where future generations with genetic modification
will be more intelligent so that they can overcome the capability barrier required by
a theoretically secure scheme. However, this may not be realized in our generation.
Therefore, we may need to pursue the second approach, relying on extra devices to
complement human capabilities. As shown in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, new
mobile devices with touchscreen feature can be used to design a practical leakage-
resilient password entry scheme [76]. Correspondingly, other devices can be used
to design user authentication schemes with other security properties. The num-
ber of possible choices of such devices will keep increasing as technology evolves.
For example, the recent development on wearable computing devices indicates that
device-assisted user authentication would be a promising direction, as these wear-
able devices provide seamless user experience for human-computer interaction.
Besides the design problem of user authentication schemes, how to objectively
evaluate user authentication schemes has also been a challenge for a long time.
More and more researchers are now aware of the importance of user studies and
report user performance with real user data instead of mere arguments. But the eval-
uation methodology of user authentication schemes is still in its preliminary stage.
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Lack of consistency is common in the existing literature [44, 61, 23, 25, 42, 13, 12],
where it is difficult to compare the evaluation results from different work and cer-
tain evaluations are not well controlled so that it is even difficult to reproduce the
same result [15]. Therefore, the standardization of the evaluation methodology is
an important work that would advance the field of user authentication. Chapter 4 in
this dissertation made an initial step by developing the design metrics for leakage-
resilient password entry. The proposed metrics could be used as a reference to define
more general metrics for other user authentication schemes. This standardization
process is much more complicated than it appears. Since different schemes may
have different design objectives, it is difficult to define unified criteria for all kinds
of schemes. Furthermore, the evaluation methodology needs to include not only
usability but also security, as unintended user behaviors may significantly compro-
mise a security property that can only be achieved when a user performs an expected
action [24]. Many other factors need to be considered, which makes it an interesting
and challenging problem for future research.
118
Bibliography
[1] Ceiling effect. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ceiling effect.
[2] R. Anderson. Why cryptosystems fail. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on
Computer and communications security, pages 215–227, 1993.
[3] Androidcommunity. Samsung galaxy siii display specs.
http://androidcommunity.com/samsung-galaxy-siii-display-specs-edge-out-iphone-5-
20121002/.
[4] Apple. Mac os x. www.apple.com/osx/.
[5] H. J. Asghar, S. Li, J. Pieprzyk, and H. Wang. Cryptanalysis of the convex hull click
human identification protocol. In Proceedings of the 13th international conference on
Information security, pages 24–30, 2010.
[6] H. J. Asghar, J. Pieprzyk, and H. Wang. A new human identification protocol and
coppersmith’s baby-step giant-step algorithm. In Proceedings of the 8th international
conference on Applied cryptography and network security, pages 349–366, 2010.
[7] R. J. Aumann. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of Math-
ematical Economics, 1(1):67–96, 1974.
[8] A. D. Baddeley. The Essential Handbook of Memory Disorders for Clinicians, chap-
ter 1, pages 1–13. John Wiley & Sons, 2004.
[9] A. D. Baddeley and G. Hitch. Working memory. The psychology of learning and
motivation, 8:47–89, 1974.
[10] X. Bai, W. Gu, S. Chellappan, X. Wang, D. Xuan, and B. Ma. Pas: Predicate-based
authentication services against powerful passive adversaries. In Proceedings of the
2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 433–442, 2008.
[11] O. Begemann. Remote view controllers in ios 6. http://oleb.net/blog/2012/10/remote-
view-controllers-in-ios-6.
[12] A. Bianchi, I. Oakley, V. Kostakos, and D. S. Kwon. The phone lock: audio and haptic
shoulder-surfing resistant pin entry methods for mobile devices. In Proceedings of the
fifth international conference on Tangible, embedded, and embodied interaction, pages
197–200, 2011.
[13] A. Bianchi, I. Oakley, and D.-S. Kwon. Obfuscating authentication through haptics,
sound and light. In Proceedings of the 2011 annual conference extended abstracts on
Human factors in computing systems, pages 1105–1110, 2011.
[14] R. Biddle, S. Chiasson, and P. C. van Oorschot. Graphical passwords: Learning from
the first twelve years. ACM Computing Surveys, 44(4), 2012.
119
[15] J. Bonneau, C. Herley, P. van Oorschot, and F. Stajano. The quest to replace pass-
words: A framework for comparative evaluation of web authentication schemes. In
Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2012, 2012.
[16] P. Bright. RSA finally comes clean: SecurID is compromised, 2011.
arstechnica.com/security/news/2011/06/rsa-finally-comes-clean-securid-is-
compromised.ars.
[17] J. I. D. Campbell and Q. Xue. Cognitive arithmetic across cultures. Journal of Exper-
imental Psychology: General, 130(2):299–315, 2001.
[18] F. B. Colavita. Human sensory dominance. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics,
16(2):409–412, 1974.
[19] L. Corbina and J. Marquer. Effect of a simple experimental control: The recall con-
straint in sternberg’s memory scanning task. European Journal of Cognitive Psychol-
ogy, 20(5):913–935, 2008.
[20] B. Coskun and C. Herley. Can ”something you know” be saved? In Proceedings of
the 11th international conference on Information Security, pages 421–440, 2008.
[21] N. Cowan. The magical number 4 in short-term memory: a reconsideration of mental
storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(1):87–114, 2001.
[22] F. I. Craik and J. M. McDowd. Age differences in recall and recognition. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13(3):474–479, 1987.
[23] A. De Luca, M. Denzel, and H. Hussmann. Look into my eyes!: can you guess my
password? In Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security,
pages 7:1–7:12, 2009.
[24] A. De Luca, M. Langheinrich, and H. Hussmann. Towards understanding atm security:
a field study of real world atm use. In Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security, 2010.
[25] A. De Luca, E. von Zezschwitz, and H. Husmann. Vibrapass: secure authentication
based on shared lies. In Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Human
factors in computing systems, pages 913–916, 2009.
[26] P. Dunphy, A. P. Heiner, and N. Asokan. A closer look at recognition-based graphi-
cal passwords on mobile devices. In Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security, pages 3:1–3:12, 2010.
[27] D. L. Fisher. Central capacity limits in consistent mapping, visual search tasks: Four
channels or more? Cognitive Psychology, 16(4):449–484, 1984.
[28] M. Georgiev, S. Iyengar, S. Jana, R. Anubhai, D. Boneh, and V. Shmatikov. The most
dangerous code in the world: validating ssl certificates in non-browser software. In
Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pages 38–49, 2012.
[29] J. J. Gibson. Adaptation, after-effect, and contrast in the perception of curved lines.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 20(6):553–569, 1937.
[30] L. Ginzburg, P. Sitar, and G. K. Flanagin. User authentication system and method. US
Patent 7,725,712, SyferLock Technology Corporation, 2010.
120
[31] F. Gobet, P. C. R. Lane, S. Croker, P. C. H. Cheng, G. Jones, I. Oliver, and J. M. Pine.
Chunking mechanisms in human learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(6):236–
243, 2001.
[32] P. Golle and D. Wagner. Cryptanalysis of a cognitive authentication scheme (extended
abstract). In Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages
66–70, 2007.
[33] Google. Google glass. http://plus.google.com/+projectglass.
[34] R. M. Hogan and W. Kintsch. Differential effects of study and test trials on long-term
recognition and recall. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 10(5):562–
567, 1971.
[35] N. J. Hopper and M. Blum. Secure human identification protocols. In Proceedings
of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and
Information Security: Advances in Cryptology, pages 52–66, 2001.
[36] T. S. Horowitz and J. M. Wolfe. Search for multiple targets: Remember the targets,
forget the search. Perception & Psychophysics, 63(2):272–285, 2001.
[37] H. B. Hotel. ipad - free for every hotel guest. http://www.hollmann-
beletage.at/en/ipad.
[38] I. Imbo and A. Vandierendonck. The role of phonological and executive working
memory resources in simple arithmetic strategies. European Journal Of Cognitive
Psychology, 19(6):910–933, 2007.
[39] A. Imran. ipads can now be used as public kiosks. http://www.redmondpie.com/ipad-
public-kiosks-video/.
[40] A. R. Jensen. Process differences and individual differences in some cognitive tasks.
Intelligence, 11(2):107–136, 1987.
[41] P. G. Kelley, S. Komanduri, M. L. Mazurek, R. Shay, T. Vidas, L. Bauer, N. Christin,
L. F. Cranor, and J. Lopez. Guess again (and again and again) measuring password
strength by simulating password-cracking algorithms. In Proceedings of IEEE Sym-
posium on Security and Privacy 2012, 2012.
[42] D. Kim, P. Dunphy, P. Briggs, J. Hook, J. W. Nicholson, J. Nicholson, and P. Olivier.
Multi-touch authentication on tabletops. In Proceedings of the 28th international con-
ference on Human factors in computing systems, pages 1093–1102, 2010.
[43] Krebs. Would you have spotted the fraud? http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/01/would-
you-have-spotted-the-fraud.
[44] M. Kumar, T. Garfinkel, D. Boneh, and T. Winograd. Reducing shoulder-surfing by
using gaze-based password entry. In Proceedings of the 3rd symposium on Usable
privacy and security, pages 13–19, 2007.
[45] M. Lei, Y. Xiao, S. Vrbsky, C.-C. Li, and L. Liu. A virtual password scheme to protect
passwords. In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Communications,
pages 1536–1540, 2008.
121
[46] S. Li, H. Asghar, J. Pieprzyk, A.-R. Sadeghi, R. Schmitz, and H. Wang. On the
security of pas (predicate-based authentication service). In Proceedings of the 2009
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 209–218, 2009.
[47] S. Li, S. A. Khayam, A.-R. Sadeghi, and R. Schmitz. Breaking randomized linear
generation functions based virtual password system. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE
International Conference on Communications, pages 23–27, 2010.
[48] S. Li and H. yeung Shum. Secure human-computer identification (interface) systems
against peeping attacks: SecHCI. In Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/268,
2005.
[49] J. Long and J. Wiles. No Tech Hacking: A Guide to Social Engineering, Dumpster
Diving, and Shoulder Surfing. Syngress, 2008.
[50] I. Martinovic, D. Daviesy, M. Franky, D. Peritoy, T. Rosz, and D. Song. On the
feasibility of side-channel attacks with brain-computer interfaces. In Proceedings of
the 21st USENIX Security Symposium, 2012.
[51] T. Matsumoto. Gummy and conductive silicone rubber fingers. In Proceedings of
the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and
Information Security: Advances in Cryptology, pages 574–576, 2002.
[52] T. Matsumoto and H. Imai. Human identification through insecure channel. In Pro-
ceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of
cryptographic techniques, pages 409–421, 1991.
[53] Microsoft. Windows 8. windows.microsoft.com.
[54] F. Miller. Telegraphic code to insure privacy and secrecy in the transmission of tele-
grams. C.M. Cornwell, 1882.
[55] P. A. Nobel and R. M. Shiffrin. Retrieval processes in recognition and cued recall.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27(2):384–
413, 2001.
[56] T. Perkovic, A. Mumtaz, Y. Javed, S. Li, S. A. Khayam, and M. Cagalj. Breaking
undercover: Exploiting design flaws and nonuniform human behavior. In Proceedings
of the Seventh Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, 2011.
[57] D. Rohrer and J. Wixted. An analysis of latency and interresponse time in free recall.
Memory. & Cognition, 22(5):511–524, 1994.
[58] V. Roth, K. Richter, and R. Freidinger. A pin-entry method resilient against shoulder
surfing. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications
security, pages 236–245, 2004.
[59] RSA. RSA SecurID two-factor authentication, 2011.
www.rsa.com/products/securid/sb/10695 SIDTFA SB 0210.pdf.
[60] J. H. Saltzer and M. D. Schroeder. The protection of information in computer systems.
Proceedings of the IEEE, 63(9):1278–1308, 1975.
[61] H. Sasamoto, N. Christin, and E. Hayashi. Undercover: authentication usable in front
of prying eyes. In Proceeding of the twenty-sixth annual SIGCHI conference on Hu-
man factors in computing systems, pages 183–192, 2008.
122
[62] R. Shay, P. G. Kelley, S. Komanduri, M. L. Mazurek, B. Ur, T. Vidas, L. Bauer,
N. Christin, and L. F. Cranor. Correct horse battery staple: exploring the usability
of system-assigned passphrases. In Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security, 2012.
[63] D. X. Song, D. Wagner, and X. Tian. Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks
on ssh. In Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Security Symposium, 2001.
[64] Spycop. Hardware keylogger detection. http://spycop.com/keyloggerremoval.htm.
[65] S. Sternberg. Memory-scanning: Mental processes revealed by reaction-time experi-
ments. American Scientist, 57:421–457, 1969.
[66] L. J. Stifelman, B. Arons, C. Schmandt, and E. A. Hulteen. Voicenotes: a speech inter-
face for a hand-held voice notetaker. In Proceedings of the INTERCHI ’93 conference
on Human factors in computing systems, pages 179–186, 1993.
[67] TCG. Trusted computing group. www.trustedcomputinggroup.org.
[68] T. D. Tomlinson, D. E. Huber, C. A. Rieth, and E. J. Davelaarc. An interference
account of cue-independent forgetting in the no-think paradigm. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 106(37):15588–15593, 2009.
[69] N. Unsworth and R. W. Engle. The nature of individual differences in working mem-
ory capacity: Active maintenance in primary memory and controlled search from sec-
ondary memory. Psychological Review, 114(1):104–132, 2007.
[70] E. Vogel and M. Machizawa. Neural activity predicts individual differences in visual
working memory capacity. Nature, 428(6984):748–751, 2004.
[71] D. Weinshall. Cognitive authentication schemes safe against spyware (short paper). In
Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 295–300,
2006.
[72] S. Wiedenbeck, J. Waters, L. Sobrado, and J.-C. Birget. Design and evaluation of a
shoulder-surfing resistant graphical password scheme. In Proceedings of the working
conference on Advanced visual interfaces, pages 177–184, 2006.
[73] G. F. Woodman and M. M. Chun. The role of working memory and long-term memory
in visual search. Visual Cognition, 14(4-8):808–830, 2006.
[74] G. F. Woodman and S. J. Luck. Visual search is slowed when visuospatial working
memory is occupied. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11(2):269–274, 2004.
[75] Q. Yan, J. Han, Y. Li, and R. H. Deng. On limitations of designing leakage-resilient
password systems: Attacks, principles and usability. In Proceedings of the 19th An-
nual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2012.
[76] Q. Yan, J. Han, Y. Li, J. Zhou, and R. H. Deng. Designing leakage-resilient password
entry on touchscreen mobile devices. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM Symposium on
Information, Computer and Communications Security, 2013.
[77] ZDNet. More ipad love: Now hotels offer ipad to customers.
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/apple/more-ipad-love-now-hotels-offer-ipad-to-
customers/6850.
123
[78] H. Zhao and X. Li. S3pas: A scalable shoulder-surfing resistant textual-graphical
password authentication scheme. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference
on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops - Volume 02, pages
467–472, 2007.
124
